Latinos and Substantive Representation in the U.S. House of Representatives: Direct, Indirect, or Nonexistent?
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Latinos and Substantive Representation in the U.S. House of Representatives: Direct, Indirect, or Nonexistent?*

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Theory: This article poses and examines theories concerning substantive representation of Latinos in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Hypothesis: With increasing numbers of Latinos in the United States and in the U.S. House during the 1980s, an increase in direct (dyadic) substantive representation of Latinos might be anticipated.

Method: Regression analysis is used to analyze scores of congressional voting patterns from Southwest Voter Research Institute (SWVRI) relative to (a) the ethnic background of representatives, and (b) the percent of Latino constituents in House districts.

Results: As with previous studies of Representatives’ voting patterns in the 1970s, this study finds little direct, substantive representation of Latinos. Representatives who are of Latino origin have somewhat distinct voting patterns, and Latino constituencies have little impact on how representatives vote. But during the period studied, legislation deemed salient to Latinos was enacted, indicating that collective or partisan substantive representation does occur. The empirical and normative implications of these findings are considered.

Representation, a central issue in U.S. politics and governance, is a complex concept, having several dimensions.¹ How well individuals and groups are represented in governmental institutions, including legislative bodies, warrants attention in any case but may be especially important in regard to those historically underrepresented. Latinos, one of the fastest growing populations in the United States, comprise about 8% of the entire U.S. population and about a quarter of the population of such large states as California and Texas.² Yet, little attention has been given to representation or to other

*The authors would like to thank Walter Stone, John McIver, and Mohan Penubarti for their comments on and help with this paper. Any shortcomings of the paper are the authors’ alone, however.

¹Individuals can obtain the data and documentation necessary to replicate the analysis from the authors. The data used were compiled from several sources noted in the references.

²There has been considerable debate regarding the proper name or label to use regarding this population. Some observers prefer “Hispanic,” others “Mexican American,” “Chicano,” etc. For reasons that need not be discussed, “Latino” will generally be used here.

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significant normative questions concerning Latinos in U.S. political science research (cf. Hero 1992, Meier and Stewart 1991). The dearth of research on Latinos extends to research on national institutions, such as Congress. Latino representation in Congress, particularly substantive representation is examined here.

Descriptive, or sociological, representation means essentially the "ability of groups to elect representatives with similar traits" (Welch and Hibbing [1984] 1988)—in the present case, being able to elect representatives of Latino background. Research consistently indicates a low degree of Latino descriptive representation at various levels and in various institutions of U.S. government (even controlling for non-citizenship; see, e.g., Welch 1990, Meier and Stewart 1991, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984, Hero 1992). Substantive representation means having a "representative with congruent policy views acting as an advocate" (cf. Welch and Hibbing 1988, 291–292). As with descriptive representation, research indicates little substantive representation of Latinos (cf. Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984, Welch and Hibbing 1988, Meier and Stewart 1991).

The central focus of this paper is voting in the U.S. House of Representatives on issues defined as salient to Latinos. The analysis builds on earlier work on Latino representation in Congress (Welch and Hibbing 1988), yet goes beyond that work in several important respects. Welch and Hibbing studied the 93rd through 96th Congresses (1972–1980), using the conservative coalition score as the measure of substantive representation. The use of conservative coalition scores was based on their expectation that, with some exceptions, Latinos on the whole would "be more liberal than Anglos, more likely to favor government intervention in the marketplace and in protecting individual rights" (Welch and Hibbing 1988, 292; cf., however, Dyer and Vedlitz 1986; de la Garza et al. 1992, 84).

In this examination of substantive representation, the major dependent variable is how members of Congress voted "on issues of concern to Latino leaders," in the 100th Congress as determined by the Southwest Voter Research Institute, Inc. (SWVRI 1989). The SWVRI is a non-profit, nonpartisan organization that undertakes analyses regarding the interests of Mexican Americans/Latinos. The SWVRI scores represent "the extent to which votes [by Members of Congress] coincide with Hispanic state legislators' views on the issues" (SWVRI 1989).

The SWVRI scores were developed in the following way. All Latino state legislators in the country were mailed a questionnaire in January 1989. Twenty issues considered by the 100th Congress in 1987 and 1988 were included in the poll. The state legislators were asked to indicate how they would have voted on each issue; "don't know" responses were permitted.

Those issues with more than 75% in agreement, either in favor or against, were deemed
The SWVRI score addresses most of the concerns raised by Welch and Hibbing (1988, 294) regarding measures of Latino interests. The SWVRI scores are based on a number of votes \((n = 15)\), and an array of issues\(^4\), including domestic social service measures (e.g., Housing, the Homeless, Civil Rights, Legal Services) and foreign policy questions seen as especially important to the Latino population (cf. Welch and Hibbing 1988, 294, 297; see Appendix).\(^5\)

**Analysis**

In addressing substantive representation of Latinos in the House during the 100th Congress (1987–88), two major questions are examined: (A) whether Representatives who are of Latino origin have distinctive patterns of roll-call voting, and (B) whether larger Latino populations (constituencies) have an effect on the voting behavior of their representatives (regardless of representatives’ own ethnic backgrounds).\(^6\) Other variables that to have a “Latino position.” This decision rule resulted in 15 votes in the House (and 15 votes in the Senate) used to create a Latino (SWVRI) support score.

A composite score—ranging from 0 to 100—was given to each member of Congress indicating the percent agreement with Hispanic state legislators’ views. If the member was absent or did not vote on a particular issue, a “?” is shown, but that issue was not figured into the composite score (SWVRI 1990).

For the analysis undertaken in the present paper, Representatives were included only if they had actually voted on at least 11 of the 15 votes selected by SWVRI. That threshold was chosen to assure that members who participated on just a few of the votes were not included.

\(^4\)Several problems with the use of roll-call votes have been raised (Fleisher and Bond 1992, 527; Hall and Wayman 1990, 801–802). Probably the major concern is that roll-call votes reflect strategic, as well as policy, goals. Despite possible shortcomings, roll-call votes are nonetheless a central component of the legislative and representative process.

\(^5\)The SWVRI scores also include other votes that some observers may not deem directly relevant to Latino interests. These votes should not be discounted, for at least two reasons. To assume that Latino interests are only (directly) affected by, and that Latinos only have concerns about, issues that have explicit Latino dimensions is empirically questionable and normatively suspect. Also the scant previous research that has been published on our central question (i.e., Welch and Hibbing) did not examine votes chosen with specific attention to Latino concerns that the SWVRI votes have.

As it turns out, SWVRI scores are highly correlated with conservative coalition scores for the 100th Congress \((r = −.85)\). To further assure that any differences in findings between the present research and the previous study are not due to the different dependent variables, the analyses of substantive representation were also undertaken with U.S. House members’ conservative coalition scores. When this was done, the major findings discussed later were not altered.

\(^6\)In 1987–88 there were 10 Latino members of the U.S. House, up from five during 1970s (the period of the Welch and Hibbing study, cf. 1988, 291, 298). In 1987–88, 2% of U.S. House members were Latinos, while 6.4% of the nation’s population was of Hispanic origin. Thus, Latinos are represented just about one-third (.36) of what parity predicts, which was similar to the .44 ratio for blacks (cf. Grofman and Handley 1989, 444.)
might have an impact were also included: percent urban population in the district (Congressional Districts in the 1980s), percent black population in the district (Almanac of American Politics 1990), per capita income in the district (Cavanagh 1984), and representatives’ party affiliation (cf. Welch and Hibbing 1988, 293–94).7

The Representatives included in the initial stages of the analysis are, in line with previous research, those whose districts have at least 5% Hispanic population (n = 115; cf. Welch and Hibbing 1988) and who had participated in at least 11 of the 15 votes selected by the SWVRI.8 The mean SWVRI score for representatives from these 114 districts is 67.2 (ranging from 0 to 100; standard deviation = 41.2). Table 1 presents specific findings.

A. The Voting Patterns of Latino Representatives

Table 1 (Model 1A) shows that Latino representatives score 10 points higher on the SWVRI measure than non-Latinos. This level of difference is fairly close to Welch and Hibbing’s finding that Hispanic representatives have “voting records . . . nearly 13 points [on a scale of 0 to 100] less conservative [or more liberal] than a non-Hispanic representative.” In the Welch and Hibbing study (1988, 295), Hispanic representatives’ scores were different from non-Hispanics at statistically significant levels; here they are not.

Welch and Hibbing also examined patterns within regions and found that Hispanic representatives from the southwest (Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas) had conservative coalition scores 23 points less conservative (more liberal) than their non-Latino counterparts. Our

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7 There is surprisingly little correlation between the independent variables; see note to Table 1.

8 The 5% threshold approximates the national average for Latinos (7% to 10%); it also reduces the number of congressional districts from 435 to 114. A higher threshold of 10% would reduce the number of districts below a level for reliable estimates.
Table 1. Impact of Hispanic US House Representative (Model 1A) and Percent Hispanic in Congressional District (Model 1B) on SWVRI Voter Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1A</th>
<th>Model 1B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Representative</td>
<td>10.01</td>
<td>9.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.97)</td>
<td>(8.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Hispanic in congressional district</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent urban</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent black</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>73.43***</td>
<td>73.42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.71)</td>
<td>(3.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-28.42**</td>
<td>-28.51**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.89)</td>
<td>(11.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted (R^2)</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>16.09</td>
<td>16.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N =)</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(F =)</td>
<td>127.03***</td>
<td>104.88***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Correlation diagnostics indicate no problems of multicollinearity. Pearson (\(r\)) correlation between percent Latino and party identification is .28; between percent Latino and percent urban is .06; and between percent Latino and per capita income is -.52. The correlation between percent urban and per capita income is .20; and between percent urban and party identification is .34. The correlation between per capita income and percent Democratic vote is -.38.

Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.
* = .05 probability; ** = .01 probability; *** = .001 probability.

study found that Latino representatives in the southwest differed from non-Latinos on the SWVRI score by only about 6.5 points in the 100th Congress (results not shown). This difference is, then, substantially less in 1987–88 than it had been during the 1970s.\(^9\)

B. Latino Constituencies and Voting Patterns

Perhaps the small difference between Hispanic and Anglo members of Congress results because Anglo Representatives are also responsive to

\(^9\)With a "pooled" data set (discussed later) Welch and Hibbing also examined the Hispanic(s) (of whom there was only one in each Congress) vs. non-Hispanic members of Congress from the New York–New Jersey area. Such an examination is not undertaken here because of the absence of a similar data set.
Hispanic constituents. Model 1B shows the impact of the percent Hispanic population in the district on Representatives’ voting patterns (cf. Welch and Hibbing 1988, 295–296). Percent Hispanic in the district has no independent impact on SWVRI voter scores. The representatives’ political party affiliation (coded Republican = 0, Democrat = 1) is clearly the most important variable in the analysis; percent urban in the district has a significant impact as well. These findings for districts with 5% or more Hispanics contrast with those of Welch and Hibbing, who found a weak (but statistically significant) relationship between percent Hispanic constituency and conservative coalition scores.

When only the southwest districts were analyzed, percent Hispanic among constituents again has no independent impact (results not shown). That is, patterns within regions concerning Hispanic substantive representation are similar to those for the nation as a whole. Again, this finding is somewhat different from that of Welch and Hibbing (cf. 1988, 295–97).

The evidence thus far suggests little or no Latino substantive representation in the 100th Congress. In contrast, Welch and Hibbing (1988, 297) claim that “in the U.S. House, Hispanics do not lack influence; they just lack the influence their numbers warrant.” Almost a decade later, our evidence suggests a continued lack of substantive representation for Latinos.

While both this and the earlier study find weak to virtually nonexistent substantive representation, there are some differences in the findings. What might account for the differences? The different dependent variables used do not explain this because, as noted earlier, when the conservative coalition score is substituted for the SWVRI score, the findings remain essentially unchanged. Several possible explanations that are not mutually exclusive for the differences can be offered.

One explanation is that representatives’ voting patterns were, simply, different in the 1970s than in 1987–88. There was, in fact, substantially greater partisan polarization in Congressional voting during the 1980s than the 1970s (Stone, Rapoport and Abramowitz 1990). This polarization may have led to greater support among Democrats, and less among Republicans, for policies salient to groups such as Latinos. Hence, what was partly explained in the 1970s by a factor such as “percentage Hispanic in the district,” may have been subsumed by party affiliation during the 1980s; this is developed further below. Another, perhaps related, point is that the 100th Congress also differed from the congresses of the 1970s due to the 1980 reapportionment. The distribution of Latinos within House districts may have been altered in such a way and to an extent that produced different roll-call voting patterns.

Yet another explanation for the different findings may lie in an assump-
tion, and related data aggregation, of the Welch and Hibbing study. Welch and Hibbing contend that "since members of Congress build distinct voting records in every Congress, we have treated each representative’s record in each of these two-year periods as a unique case. Thus the total possible \( N \) for the project was 1,740 (4 [Congresses, 1972–80] X 435), even though the total number of individuals serving during these eight years was much lower" (1988,298). Treating each representative’s record in each two-year period as a unique case may not be entirely appropriate. One would expect a strong correlation between a Representative’s voting pattern from one Congress to the next. What may have happened, then, is that due to the large number of cases, the relationships (and their statistical significance) reported by Welch and Hibbing were somewhat inflated by their assumption of uniqueness.

While Table 1 and related evidence provide virtually no indication of substantive representation for Latinos in the 100th Congress, other evidence confounds that. Specifically, the outcome of every one of the 15 votes used to calculate the SWVRI scores was congruent with the preferences of the Latino state legislators questioned by SWVRI. Thus, although the percentage of Latinos among constituents is not significantly related to higher SWVRI scores, all the votes included in the SWVRI scores were decided in the "preferred" direction. The implications of this deserve consideration.

**Indirect Substantive Representation?**

Scholars contend that substantive representation may take different forms (Weissberg 1978). Representation can be "dyadic" (or "direct"), where the question is whether a direct link exists between the voting patterns of elected representatives and their constituents/interests. Dyadic representation has been the focus of the present study, to this point, and was likewise the focus for Welch and Hibbing. On the other hand, substantive representation may be "collective" or "institutional" or "virtual"; that is, legislatures may collectively represent the people "as a whole" (Weissberg 1978). This can also be viewed as indirect substantive representation.

A variation of collective representation is Hurley’s (1989) concept of partisan representation that focuses "on how well the parties in Congress represent their rank-and-file identifiers." Hurley claims that individual legislators "may not be able to represent accurately the opinions of a district that is heterogeneous but the parties in Congress can and may respond to the distribution of opinion among their identifiers in the electorate. In this way district minorities receive representation. A Democrat living in a dis-
trict represented by a Republican may find himself or herself at frequent odds with the district’s own representative, but may have his or her view taken by the majority of Democrats in the institution” (Hurley 1989, 242, emphasis added).

Weissberg’s and Hurley’s arguments suggest, then, that substantive representation may occur in a collective or indirect partisan form, although it may not be directly predictable based on district characteristics, such as proportion of Latinos. While the concepts of collective and/or partisan representation cannot be tested here, those ideas do suggest that a focus on the institution “as a whole” is useful. Therefore, the previous analysis was extended to all House districts.

Data for the extended analysis indicate that House members who are themselves Hispanic have SWVRI scores about 10 points (9.59) higher than the overall average. Hispanic representatives within the southwestern states differ by almost 9 points from all other southwestern House members, controlling for other variables. The extended analysis does not alter findings reported in Model 1A of Table 1.

Model 1B was also extended to examine the relationship between percent Hispanic population and SWVRI scores for all House districts. When all districts are included, the percent Hispanic population in the district continues to have no measurable impact on Representatives’ voter score. This provides additional evidence of limited to nonexistent indirect Hispanic representation. Party affiliation of the representative remains the most important variable. Other analysis (not shown) indicates that non-Latino House members from the southwest and from Florida have SWVRI scores 16 points lower than the overall average, while those from New York and New Jersey have scores almost 15 points higher than the general average (cf. Welch and Hibbing 1988, 296).

A final point worthy of consideration is raised by the concept of “partisan” (collective) substantive representation as well as by the consistent finding that party is the strongest predictor of SWVRI scores. While political party is a strong predictor of substantive representation, it may be that percent Latino in districts affects the level of electoral support for Democratic candidates (cf. de la Garza et al. 1992, 126). And that substantive representation occurs through party voting.

The relationship between percent Hispanic in a district and vote for Democratic candidate is examined in Table 2. The process outlined does seem to occur to a limited degree. Percent Latino in the district has a small (and statistically significant) impact on the vote for Democratic candidates in districts with 5% or more Hispanic population. There is no significant impact when all districts are considered; this is hardly surprising given
Table 2. Impact of Percent Hispanic in Congressional District on Vote for Democratic Congressional Candidate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Districts</th>
<th>Districts with 5% plus Hispanic Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Hispanic in</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>congressional district</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent urban</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent black</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income</td>
<td>-0.36***</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>69.37***</td>
<td>35.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.634)</td>
<td>(14.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>23.85</td>
<td>20.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N =$</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F =$</td>
<td>25.92***</td>
<td>13.88***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.  
* = .05 probability; ** = .01 probability; *** = .0001 probability.

that Latino proportions are, of course, small when the other districts are included.

Conclusion

The study finds little or no direct or indirect substantive representation of Latinos in the U.S. House. Even with the doubling of the number of Latinos in the U.S. House during the 1980s, Latino descriptive representation in the late 1980s was well below parity in Congress. Initial analysis indicated that the differences in voting patterns between Latino and non-Latino House members are not significant, and appear less different than they had been during the 1970s. Additionally, the relationship between the size of Latino constituencies and direct or "dyadic" substantive Congressional voting patterns in the 100th Congress appears no stronger, and, perhaps weaker, than indicated in research from the 1970s.

On the other hand, the roll-call votes deemed to be most important to Latinos were all decided consistent with Latino preferences. Thus, the concept of "collective" or indirect substantive representation, and a specific variant of that, partisan representation, was discussed and the analysis was
extended to all districts. Percent Hispanic in district is related, albeit weakly, to the vote for Democrats in those districts with 5% or more Hispanics (but not when all districts are considered).

Overall, dyadic-direct substantive representation of Latinos in the 100th Congress was limited, and less than in the 1970s. Any substantive representation that does occur does so in a collective and/or partisan form and results mostly from Democrats and generally comes from Representatives outside the southwest, except for those who are themselves Latino. Even Representatives who are of Latino origin may be affected more by factors such as party affiliation and levels of district urbanization. The absence of descriptive and/or substantive (dyadic) representation of Latinos, as Latinos, in Congress mirrors their descriptive underrepresentation at virtually all levels and in all institutions of American government.

The finding that Congress may substantively represent Latinos, albeit only collectively, should not be overlooked. This study is the first to find evidence of indirect substantive representation regarding Latinos. This finding is important both theoretically and normatively. At the same time, whether this collective-partisan representation “compensates” fully or partly for the essential absence of direct substantive representation is itself a theoretical and normative issue that deserves future attention. At this juncture, however, several points might be briefly noted.

The evidence examined in this and the previous study (Welch and Hibbing) only focused upon roll-call votes actually taken, of course. There could be issues of concern to Latinos that were not the subject of floor votes in Congress. The collective-partisan representation on House floor votes therefore actually taken says nothing about whether other, perhaps more significant, Latino concerns were placed “on the agenda” in the first place (cf. SWVRI 1989, 8; Hall and Wyman 1990).

Finally, while collective-partisan processes is a form of substantive representation, its indirectness and unpredictability may make the achievement of accountability difficult. A brief look at the Senate data on the SWVRI scores indicates little or no relationship to percent Latino in the state; and only 6 of the 15 votes used to calculate the Senate SWVRI scores had outcomes that were congruent with Latino preferences. Collective or substantive representation seems weak to nonexistent in the Senate as well. These and related issues underscore the need for further empirical and normative assessment of Latinos and U.S. democracy.

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### APPENDIX

**House Votes Used to Create SWVRI Scores for the 100th Congress**

**H01 Contra Aid** Passage of H.J. Res. 175, to block $40 million in aid to the Nicaraguan contras until the Reagan administration accounted for the money provided thus far. Passed 230 to 196. 3/11/87 Hispanic Leadership poll favored a “yea” vote.

**H02 Star Wars** Bennétt (D-Fla.) amendment to H.R. 1748 (FY 1988 Defense Authorization) to reduce spending for Star Wars by $500 million. Adopted 219 to 199. 5/12/87 Hispanic Leadership Poll favored a “yea” vote.

**H03 Housing** Gray (D-Ill.) amendment to H.R. 4 (Community Development Act) to lower from 30% to 25% of income the rent elderly tenants pay in subsidized housing. Adopted 284 to 137. 6/10/87 Hispanic Leadership Poll favored a “yea” vote.

**H04 Housing** Passage of H.R. 4 (Housing and Community Development Act) authorizing $10.6 billion for federally assisted housing, and $5.2 billion for other housing programs. Passed 285 to 120. 6/11/87 Hispanic Leadership Poll favored a “yea” vote.

**H05 Legal Services** Shumway (R-Calif.) amendment to H.R 2763 (FY 1988 Justice Department Appropriations) to delete the Legal Services Corporation's $305.5 million appropriation. Rejected 127 to 282. 7/1/87 Hispanic Leadership Poll favored a “nay” vote.

**H06 Catastrophic Health Insurance** Passage of H.R. 2470, to expand Medicare benefits to protect elderly and disabled people from the costs of catastrophic illness. Passed 302 to 127. 7/22/87 Hispanic Leadership Poll favored a “yea” vote.

**H07 Central American Refugees** Passage of H.R. 618, to suspend for two years the U.S. government’s planned deportation of Salvadoran and Nicaraguan refugees. Passed 237 to 181. 7/28/87 Hispanic leadership favored a “yea” vote.

**H08 Occupational Health** Passage of H.R. 162, to require notification of workers exposed to toxic chemicals or other workplace hazards that mean a potentially high risk of disease. Passed 225 to 186. 10/15/87 Hispanic Leadership Poll favored a “yea” vote.

**H09 Welfare Reform** Passage of H.R. 1720, Family Welfare Reform Act, requiring states to provide education and training to put long-term welfare recipients to work, and replacing the existing AFDC program with a Family Support Program. Passed 230 to 194. 12/16/87 Hispanic Leadership Poll favored a “yea” vote.

**H10 Contra Aid** Passage of H.J. Res. 444, approving President Reagan’s request for $36.2 million in weapons and humanitarian aid for the Nicaraguan contras. Rejected 211 to 219. 2/3/88 Hispanic leadership favored a “nay” vote.

**H11 Civil Rights** Vote to override President Reagan’s veto of S. 557, Civil Rights Restoration Act. Veto overridden 292 to 133. 3/22/88 Hispanic Leadership Poll favored a “yea” vote.
APPENDIX

House Votes Used to Create SWVRI Scores for the 100th Congress

H12 Amnesty Passage of H.R. 4222, extending the amnesty program for eligible illegal aliens from May 4, 1988 to November 30, 1988. Passed 213 to 201. 4/20/88 Hispanic Leadership Poll favored a “yea” vote.

H13 Star Wars Bennett (D-Fla) amendment to H.R 4264 (FY 1989 Defense Authorization) to reduce funding for Star Wars by $600 million. Adopted 223 to 195. 5/4/88 Hispanic Leadership Poll favored a “yea” vote.

H14 Plant Closings Notification Passage of S. 2527, requiring employers to give 60 days notice of plant closings. Passed 286 to 136. 7/13/88 Hispanic Leadership Poll favored a “yea” vote.

H15 Homeless Passage of H.R. 4352 (McKinney Homeless Assistance Act) authorizing $642 million to help house, feed and care for the homeless. Passed 333 to 80. 8/3/88 Hispanic Leadership Poll favored a “yea” vote.

REFERENCES


