

Appendix 3a – Things cut for space reasons from Chapter 3

Comparative Work

Electoral System Literature

Party-list proportional representation (PR) systems are typically held responsible for programmatic behavior, while systems that encourage voters to cast ballots for individual candidates are seen as leading to more personalistic and clientelistic behavior.

Carey and Shugart's elegant typology indicates that depersonalized voting and programmatic behavior will be especially likely to emerge where parties control nominations, voters cannot disturb the party list, votes are pooled over the party, and districts are large. In contrast, systems that in particular allow voters to disturb party lists (such as Brazil's open-list PR system) provide incumbent politicians great freedom to join any party of their choosing and offer politicians far less incentive to follow party instructions, making party discipline more difficult.

Programmatic vs. Clientelist Party Systems

I note in the book that the programmatic "model" "holds that citizen-politician linkages are indirect, as parties provide collective (i.e., non-excludable and non-exhaustible) benefits that are not directly contingent on individual voting choices." However, the differences in the benefits are of course usually dependent on who gets elected.

As Kitschelt (1995b) notes, "Programme-based parties incur the highest coordination costs among party supporters and leaders and require the greatest amount of information and cognitive skills among voters to arrive at an intelligent choices between competing alternatives" (449).

While clientelism may not be centered on social cleavages, this does not mean that clientelism cannot reinforce existing cleavages. If, for example, a country faced a substantial cleavage between urban and rural groups and a clientelist government targeted, in particular, certain rural groups with selective benefits, this would probably reinforce the cleavage between urban and rural groups. On the other hand, given the procedural definition of clientelism noted in Chapter 1, the conclusion from the above example that clientelism was reinforcing the urban-rural cleavage is based on the assumption that the government was not simply targeting all rural areas with benefits and penalizing all urban areas, irrespective of their support for the government.

I note in the book that, "In the world's newest democracies, programmatic party competition appears to be far from the norm." Because of the difficulties surrounding marketization of post-Communist economies—so that, for example, socioeconomic cleavages would not form as they had in the West—and strong ethno-nationalist divisions that overpower any other sort of cleavage, a number of scholars were skeptical of the likelihood of programmatic competition forming in many of the Eastern European and the former Soviet Republic countries (Evans and Whitefield 1993; Kitschelt 1995b). Kitschelt's (1995c) preliminary research bears these predictions out. Similarly, cleavage-based, programmatic competition appears not to have developed in much of Latin America. Dix (1989) argues that the late and rapid modernization process in Latin America may have prevented the formation of working classes and their integration into the political system by leftist parties. Moreover, the working class won suffrage rights without the aid of leftist parties, thereby weakening a potential link between them. In

place of leftist workers' parties, catchall parties inclusive of multiple social cleavages formed, and Latin American parties have typically centered on personalities, even well after their formation.

As programmatic party competition tends to be institutionalized into a country's politics, we might presume that non-programmatic systems are not institutionalized. Where personalistic politics, founded on individual candidacies, non-institutionalized parties, and a direct exchange between voters and candidates predominates, this assessment would be correct (see O'Donnell 1994). However, it is not uncommon in transition countries for clientelistic or patronage oriented networks to be institutionalized based on non-mediated exchange of private goods targeted to specific individuals or small constituencies for votes. Indeed, well-established and routinized clientelist parties may be extremely well institutionalized according to Huntington's (1968) definition of institutionalization as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (12).

Additional Theories of Citizen-Politician Linkages

In the book I noted some less well developed societally based explanations for such linkages, but more sophisticated societally based explanations have recently emerged. For example, Kitschelt (1996) suggests that non-programmatic appeals may be particularly attractive in many new democracies: Where voters are less educated, they may have short time horizons and fail to recognize the problems in linking selective policies and collective outcomes. In contrast, more educated voters with longer time horizons are less likely to accept individually targeted, short-term benefits that create worse outcomes both for the country as a whole and in the long term. As a result, elites may seek to create non-programmatic incentives in the institutions in poor, uneducated countries.

The emphasis on SNTV/MMD in the study of Japanese politics fits in with the general trend in political science, which typically emphasizes explanations based on institutions and the electoral system for the shape of citizen-politician linkages. Electoral institutions are indeed critical in shaping citizen-politician linkages: Any societal pressures to reduce a country's clientelist arrangements must run through institutional channels that privilege those who favor clientelism's continued maintenance.

Most theories of citizen-politician linkages focus on legislative electoral systems, but other institutions are also important. The timing of different elections is critical: Where national elections precede regional ones, parties will tend to hold a national, more programmatic orientation (Filippov and Shvetsova 1995; Linz and Stepan 1992). Also, presidential systems tend toward less programmatic competition. While it can be argued that presidentialism nationalizes political debate, thereby increasing the importance of issues and the likelihood that parties will focus on providing collective goods at the national level, presidentialism also encourages more personalistic behavior in a number of ways. Presidential elections become a de facto single member district (SMD) competition between candidates, drawing attention away from the candidates' roles as representatives of parties. The focus on candidates as individuals disorganizes parties as program-based coalitions. Once elected, the president needs a personal agenda that will permit him to negotiate with various groups, not just his own party. Legislators in presidential systems have greater individual freedom in deliberating and voting on legislation, because their party does not depend on them to maintain a government within the parliament. For empirical evidence, see Filippov and Shvetsova 1995; Harmel and Janda 1982; Kitschelt 1995c, 1996; Ordeshook 1995; Shugart and Carey 1992.

Where the overall institutional configuration creates an environment in which the executive and legislative bodies share little collective identity, parties are even less likely to be institutionalized along programmatic lines. For example, in Russia, which combines a strong presidency with a legislature (Duma) in which many members are elected through a national PR-list system (and where legislative and presidential elections occur at different times rather than concurrently), both bodies can claim national mandates but may well end up with different parties in control, making conflict between executive and legislative bodies and their leading parties highly likely. When parties have difficulty winning both branches, institutionalized programmatic parties are difficult to achieve.

Also, factors such as historical legacy—the features of the old system that carry over into the new—may play a key part in shaping party competition. These factors all shaped post-Communist party systems in a number of different ways (Ishiyama 1995, 1997). Elites in the constitutional bargaining process frequently base their choices about the design of new institutions on their desire and ability to maintain control over the state's resources (Easter 1997). For example, where post-Communists still held considerable resources such as advantageous social and organizational networks and the capacity to build clientelistic linkages, they had strong incentives to push inter-party competition toward personalities and local ties, and away from debate among ideologies and programs. Such parties were likely to choose institutions that personalized political competition.

It should also be noted that the institutions that are chosen during transition period may not have the desired effects in the short run as things remain out of equilibrium. However, in the long run the political institutions will hold great influence in reinforcing or altering the political behavior of the various actors.

Japan

Information on SNTV/MMD

SNTV/MMD was used in the Japanese Lower House (1947-1993), Japan's Upper House throughout the postwar, the South Korean National Assembly (1973-1988), most important assembly elections in postwar Taiwan (Grofman, Lee, Winkler, and Woodall 1999) and Japan's subnational assembly elections. For more on clientelism and SNTV/MMD in other contexts, see S.-C. Lee 1999; Park 1988.

For literature on SNTV/MMD, see especially Baker and Scheiner (2004), Christensen (2000), Christensen and Johnson (1995), Cox (1991, 1994, 1996), Cox and Niou (1994), Grofman, et al. (1999), McCubbins and Rosenbluth (1995) and Reed (1990).

Although SNTV/MMD created *incentives* for clientelistic linkages, few electoral systems always produce the results predicted of them. For example, despite maintaining a PR-list system that ought to encourage more programmatic competition, Austria has a very clientelistic system. The perceived effect of electoral systems is often based on analysis from too small a sample. Cox's work (e.g., Cox and Niou 1994) implies that one-party dominance will be particularly likely under SNTV/MMD. Yet, in prewar Japan, SNTV/MMD was accompanied by what was essentially a competitive, two-party system, with minor parties sometimes playing a role as a coalition government pivot (Fukui 1988; Kawato 1996; Scalapino 1953). Grofman (1999) indicates that some seeming truisms of SNTV are in fact outcomes that only obtain in the Japanese case. Analysis of SNTV/MMD in Korea, Taiwan, or both leads us to reject long-held beliefs about the impact of SNTV/MMD on intraparty candidate competition, particular aspects of party factionalism, and the number of parties (Grofman 1999; S.-C. Lee 1999; K.-Y. Lee 1999; Liu 1999; Mo and Brady 1999).

Japan's current factional system, based on non-regional, election-oriented factions, appears to have early roots as well. While SNTV/MMD clearly encouraged the type of factionalism that we see in Japan today, it does not appear that the 1925 system caused it. Factionalism was a significant component of the pre-1925 party structure. The early Liberal Party (*Jiyûtô*, precursor to the *Seiyūkai*, one of the central parties of the prewar period) was marked by factionalism based on region, while the Progressives' factions were based on occupation. However, *Seiyūkai* factionalism became less based on geography beginning in 1922 as groups within the party battled over cabinet reshuffling. In 1925, the SNTV/MMD electoral system in medium sized districts was introduced, perhaps partly as a result, and helped lead to increased factionalism based on region (Scalapino 1953). In short, while the 1925 system exacerbated the *Seiyūkai's* non-regional factionalism, the factionalism was present even before 1925.

Japanese Clientelism

I note in the book that many acts in Japan might appear to be clientelist, but really are at last as much "a gesture to make voters feel a welcome link between themselves and their candidates." The logic is not unlike that in Tip O'Neill's famous tales of longtime friends who threatened not to vote for him in U.S. congressional elections because he had not come to ask for their vote.

In addition to *kôenkai* and construction, there are many other groups, such as industrial and occupational organizations, that also organize the vote for politicians in Japan. Many of

these organizations are harder to monitor, but they have a clear incentive to organize the vote so as to help get elected people who will repay them through clientelist exchange (see Chapter 5).

Kôenkai offer numerous advantages for candidates. In addition to those I talk about in the book, campaigns can use *kôenkai* to get around other restrictions on campaign literature, offices, and expenditures as well (Christensen 1998).

I discuss monitoring as a key to Japanese clientelism. Monitoring and enforcement are also critical to electoral cooperation between different parties and politicians at the national level in Japan (Christensen 1996, 1998, 2000).

Modernization Logic?

If political economy plays an important role in shaping the tolerance toward and feasibility of clientelism, why has no such backlash penetrated and found success in Japan? In reality, it has, but only in parts of the country. In Japan a divide has grown between groups that benefit from and are harmed by the clientelist system. This division is most clearly evident in the differences between the urban and rural areas of the country and has led to the development of two party systems in Japan: a one-party dominant system in rural areas and a competitive system in urban areas.

While certain depressed urban regions may also be supportive of clientelism, the simplest rule of thumb is that rural areas, as a result of their lower education and skill levels—making people there less able and/or willing to be flexible in the face of threatened changes in the labor market—as well as general dependence on governmental subsidies and transfers of money for public works and support for the country's inefficient agricultural sector, are particularly supportive of the clientelist structure.

Arguments of this kind that focus on the urban-rural divide may appear to tread on unsteady ground as they give the appearance of using modernization logic (e.g., Huntington, 1968), which links clientelism to early stages of socioeconomic and political development. As Kitschelt correctly argues, the problem with such a “developmentalist” account is that it is unable to explain the persistence of clientelism in advanced democracies such as Italy and Austria (2000: 857). However, my argument here is not that low levels of socioeconomic or political development are necessary for clientelism. Rather, I am arguing that under certain conditions (high levels of rural-ness, low levels of education, substantial dependence on government support) voters will be particularly supportive of clientelism and resist efforts to give it up.

Clientelism and Geographical Concentration of the Vote (RS Index)

In analysis of the “RS Index,” a measure of geographic vote concentration, I find that LDP candidates had substantially more geographically concentrated vote bases than candidates of any other party (with the difference statistically significant at the .001 level). While this finding is consistent with a social network type argument, it also strongly suggests that through their control of resources, LDP politicians are better able to target specific regions and groups than politicians from other parties.

In analysis of RS indices, I find the difference between urban and rural candidates' level of vote concentration to be quite substantial and statistically significant at the .001 level. This difference is probably also due to the fact that the smaller populations living in rural villages where ballots are tallied means that it is easier to target more specific groups and monitor their support.

The Impact of Electoral Institutions?

In the book I note that “Electoral institutions play a major part in determining the extent to which these clientelist-supporting areas are sufficient to protect the regime that maintains clientelism.” However, in part this is not an institutional argument in that it is also LDP party strategy to maintain clientelism in order to benefit its most important client, rural beneficiaries of particularistic benefits.

Path-dependent effects can also be potent, making it likely that politicians who utilized personalistic practices in the old system will continue to pursue such behavior in the short run in the new. For example, even under SMDs little was altered in the relationships between LDP politicians and construction companies. In 1994, due to international pressure, reforms in the construction bidding processes were imposed, but little real change was seen (Woodall 1996: 147) and construction companies maintained a central role as supporters for LDP politicians (Otake 1998: 20).

Impact of International Political Economy (IPE) upon the Maintenance of Clientelism?

It might be argued that international political economic pressures played an important part in the sharp decline of clientelism in countries such as Italy, while Japan was able to sustain its clientelist system because of relative insulation from these pressures. That is, perhaps Japan was able to hold off international pressures because of its substantial personal savings and strong currency, but Italy—with less personal savings and a much weaker currency—encountered more serious constraints when confronted with high deficits, the risk of high interest rates, a currency crisis and, as a result, isolation from the European market. Such an argument is in many ways very compelling and suggests that Japan’s clientelist days may be numbered if it finds itself continuing to run up deficits.

Nevertheless, there is reason to avoid putting too much emphasis on IPE constraints and similar reason to expect Japan to maintain its clientelist system even if faced with constraints more like Italy’s. In the case of Italy, important domestic structures helped cut into the clientelist system. Italian prosecutors are largely insulated from political interference, in contrast to their counterparts in Japan who maintain only “limited independence” from political influence (Johnson 2003). As a result, it was far easier for Italian prosecutors to pursue corruption cases, which in turn both reduced popular tolerance for clientelist practices and jailed many clientelist-pushing political leaders. In addition, the PR electoral system in use in Italy at the time of these changes helped bring about the early decline of the ruling Christian Democrats, which in turn cut into the very heart of the clientelist system (see Chapter 7), while other electoral arrangements in Japan helped maintain its ruling party and clientelist practices.

Upper House Elections in Japan

The Upper House PR system also offers opportunities for monitoring and exchange. Many of the candidates given high positions on the LDP Upper House PR list have the explicit backing of particular support groups. For example, a given agricultural association will decide on a specific individual to be its LDP PR representative and lobby the LDP to place this candidate high on the party’s list. Such requests are typically assured of being met when the support group (or the candidate) is able to register a set number of individuals (usually 20,000) as LDP party members (Fukui and Fukai 1999: 142; Yomiuri Shinbun, February 26, 2003), something that raises money for the party, as well as increases the likelihood of such members voting for the party. Moreover, with the October 2000 rule change that gives voters the option of

casting ballots for individual candidates (whose votes are then added onto the total PR vote cast for their party) in Upper House PR races, parties can see exactly how many votes individual candidates are bringing to the party: Such candidates must therefore campaign hard even if they feel election is secure.

Additional Background on Japan

While land reform was pushed to its most extreme form in Japan during the Occupation, it had actually begun in 1942 (Noguchi 1999).

The early postwar Occupation of Japan had involved the U.S. severely punishing the prewar Japanese right wing for its involvement in Japanese imperialism. Many former right wing Japanese political leaders were purged from politics and imprisoned. Moreover, the Allies instituted a number of social and political economic reforms that gave greater power to the Japanese left. However, with the rise of Communism in China and Korea, the U.S. initiated a “reverse course,” in which it drastically reduced its support for the Japanese left and grew far more sympathetic and supportive of the right.