

Appendix 3b – Correlates of Support for Clientelism

I utilize the JES-II public opinion survey's 1993 variable indicating respondents' support for candidates with a localistic orientation. Given that the protection of local interests in Japan typically involves clientelist favors, such as subsidies and protection of local business, this question represents a reasonable approximation of respondents' support for clientelism and I call the dependent variable here *Clientelism Support*. I utilize a probit model: Clientelism Support is coded dichotomously: 0 for those preferring candidates working on national issues and 1 for those preferring local-issue-oriented candidates.

Given that they have less labor flexibility, I expect older citizens and those with less education to be more supportive of clientelism, as such individuals might see clientelistic practices as important in protecting their jobs in the face growing pressures to become more "efficient." Therefore, I expect the coefficient on *Age*, a 0-1 dummy variable coded 1 for respondents 55 and older, to be positive,¹ and *Education*, the level of education (on a 4-point scale from primary school education equal to 1 and university or graduate school education equal to 4) attained by the respondent, to be negative. Individuals working in particular industries ought to be especially supportive of clientelist practices and I create a 0-1 dummy variable, *Clientelist Occupation*, coded 1 for respondents working in farming, forestry, fisheries, mining, or transportation. I also create *Head Occupation*, a nearly identical variable, but one that identifies not the respondent's occupation, but instead the occupation of the head of the respondent's household. I expect both of these variables to have positive coefficients. In many cases, larger companies would be less dependent upon locally based favors to survive, so I expect *Work Size*, the number of workers (coded on a 5-point scale) employed in the respondent's place of work, to be negative.

Finally, for a number of different reasons rural voters ought to be more supportive of localistic and clientelistic practices than urban voters. For this reason, I include *Rural*, a variable indicating the level of rural-ness of the respondent's district. Rural, the same variable utilized in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, is on a 4-point scale (based on population density) running from metropolitan (1) to rural (4). Including Rural in the model is important as it helps us to control for other non-socioeconomic factors that are specific to more urban or rural areas. I expect the sign on its coefficient to be positive: More rural areas are more supportive of clientelism.

The results are listed in the first column of results in Table 3.2. The significant negative sign on *Age* is quite surprising as it suggests that older respondents are less likely than younger ones to support localistic and clientelistic behavior. This counter-intuitive result is most likely due to the interrelationship between age and education in Japan. That is, by and large, older respondents in the survey had a substantially lower level of education than younger respondents. To deal with this, I run a second model (second column of results in Table 3.2), in which I also use *Age*Edu*, an interaction term between *Age* and *Education*. Once this variable is included the results make greater sense. *Age* is positive and significant, while *Age*Edu* is negative and significant. This means that, all else being equal, older Japanese are more likely to have

¹ 55 is the rough retirement age for many professions in Japan and employment becomes markedly trickier at that age.

localistic tendencies, but older respondents with high levels of education prefer more “issue” oriented politics.

The results for the other variables are largely as expected. Except for the non-significant Clientelist Occupation in the second column, the sign on every variable is in the expected direction. Even controlling for the urban-ness of the district, respondents in particular sociodemographic/economic conditions were more likely to support localistic and presumably clientelistic behavior. The coefficient on Clientelist Occupation is non-significant, but Head Occupation and Work Size are both statistically significant and in the expected direction: Families with heads of households involved in occupations more dependent upon the benefits of clientelism and people working in smaller businesses were more likely to have a clientelistic orientation. The strongest effect was education, whereby less educated voters were markedly more likely to support localistic behavior.

[Table 3.2 about here]

Combining the means in Table 3.1 with the coefficients from the probit model listed in Table 3.2 (second column), I determine the probability of a respondent supporting localistic and clientelistic politics in each type of district (by level of urban-ness) and demonstrate the results in Figure 3.3 (see the text of Chapter 3).

Table 3.2 – Correlates of Preference for Candidates with Local Orientation (Probit)

Variable	Coefficient (Std. Er.)	Coefficient (Std. Er.)
Age	-0.011** (0.003)	0.548* (0.223)
Age*Edu	--	-0.385*** (0.104)
Education	-0.365*** (0.044)	-0.254*** (0.050)
Clientelist Occupation	0.010 (0.148)	-0.045 (0.150)
Head Occupation	0.475* (0.216)	0.484* (0.217)
Work Size	-0.113*** (0.029)	-0.104*** (0.029)
Rural	0.183*** (0.040)	0.193*** (0.040)
Constant	1.390*** (0.262)	0.628*** (0.180)
N	1125	1125
LR Chi-Sq (6)	156.18	165.62
Prob>Chi-Sq	0.000	0.000
Log Likelihood	-690.71	-685.99
Pseudo R-Sq	0.1016	0.1077

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001