

Appendix 4 – Things cut for space reasons from Chapter 4

Impact of Centralization

The argument about the impact of centralization on party affiliation is typically made in passing. In the cases I have seen, only Diaz, Magaloni, and Weingast make it a focus of the study.

Clientelism

Where transfers are automatic and not discretionary, they would not be part of an arrangement of clientelist exchange.

Financially Decentralized Cases

Especially in Financially Decentralized types, new parties can become established at the local level in some areas without even entering national contests, and can be quite strong in some areas without acquiring strength at the national level. However, this presumes the existence of electoral or other institutional rules that facilitate the growth of new parties.

U.S. Case

See Table 4.2 below for some data.

“Until the 1930s, the U.S. national government focused on distributive politics—defined as patronage (Lowi 1985)—and such politics remains a central focus even today.” The Reagan Republican House of Representatives class of 1980 is a good example of how this is the case. After ignoring constituent calls for particularized benefits, 25 percent of the class lost in the succeeding election and many then quickly changed their behavior to fall in line with such calls (Hook 1988).

The weak links between national and subnational party support does not suggest that it is easy for new parties to develop, even at the state level, in the U.S. Among other things, the widespread use of single member districts makes such development difficult.

Brazil

While Brazil has grown very decentralized, between 1930 and its recent period of democratization, the country experienced two dictatorships that centralized power and finances.

It is especially noteworthy that “national deputy candidates have made a greater effort to align themselves with governors than with presidential candidates because of governors’ control of clientelist networks (Samuels 2000a, 2000b),” given that since 1994 all presidential, gubernatorial, national deputy, national senate, and state deputy elections have been held concurrently.

Clientelist/Financially Centralized

“In *Programmatic/Centralized* systems, seats held at the local level have less to do with the breakdown of seats at the national level and more to do with popularity of the national party at the time of the local election.” In this way, subnational elections allow national parties to gauge changes in their standing since the last national election. “Although there may be a natural bit of slippage for the national majority in subnational elections—much as occurs in

midterm elections in the U.S.—the main difference between national and local outcomes then is a measure of changing sentiment.”

Italy

“Further analysis of the PCI's strength at the local level is needed to determine whether greater access to pork aided the party during the 1970s.” Another possible explanation is the use of proportional representation at the subnational level. However, Austria, too, uses PR at the subnational level, and one-party dominance was the norm in state parliaments.

Comparing Japan

In Japan over the 1970-97 period, the LDP held an average of 54 percent of the seats in the national legislature and 56 percent at the prefectural (subnational) level. On the other hand, non-LDP parties held an average of 45 percent of the national level seats, but only 30 percent at the prefectural level. Summing the LDP and non-LDP totals does not equal to 100 percent because of the large number of seats won by independent candidates.

Table 4.2 – Number of U.S. states with Democratic Party majorities among local and national level legislative delegations

		U.S. House of Representatives	
		<i>Less than Majority</i>	<i>Majority</i>
State House	<i>Less Than Majority</i>	15	8
	<i>Majority</i>	11	16

Source: <http://www.stateside.com/snapshot.html#top>.

Table 4.3 – Aggregated Proportion of Seats Won By Italian Parties in the 1970s

Parties	1970	1970	1975	1976
	Regional	National	Regional	National
PCI	27.1	27.5	32.4	34.4
PSI	10.6	9.7	12.1	9.6
PSIUP-PDUP	3.1	2.6	1.2	1.5
PRI	3	2.9	3.3	3.1
DC	37.6	38.7	35.5	38.7
PSDI	6.9	5.2	5.6	3.4
PLI	4.6	3.9	2.5	1.3
MSI	6.9	8.8	6.9	6.1
Misc	0.3	0.5	0.5	1.9

Source: Gourevitch (1978: 52).