

## Appendix 6b – Analysis of New Candidate Success in the 2000 HR Election

Probit analysis demonstrates the factors shaping new candidate success more systematically. The data set is all new candidates for the LDP and DPJ in the 2000 election. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the new candidate won and 0 if he lost. The principal independent variables in the model relate to the “quality” (coded 1 if quality, 0 if not) of the new candidate. I expect the coefficient on the “quality” variable to be positive and significant, indicating that quality new candidates are more likely to win than other new candidates.

I test alternative hypotheses by adding other variables: (1) *LDP*: whether the candidate is an LDP (coded 1) or DPJ (coded 0) member. If LDP candidates were more likely to win because of greater support for the party – whether because of the country’s longtime history of an extremely strong economy, the party’s policy flexibility, or a general feeling of opposition incompetence – LDP will be statistically significant and positive. (2) *Coordination Failure*: a measure of how well the observed candidate’s bloc (the ruling coalition for the LDP and the leading opposition parties for the DPJ) coordinated relative to the coordination of the opposing bloc. This variable is formulated by taking the number of candidates running under the banner of the candidate’s bloc and subtracting from it the number running for the opposing bloc. If coordination failure is leading to SMD losses, Coordination Failure should be statistically significant and negative. A failure to coordinate, whereby bloc A runs more candidates than bloc B will lower the probability of a bloc A candidate winning.<sup>1</sup> (3) *Campaign Expenditures*: the proportion of total campaign spending in the district expended by the candidate. Presumably, candidates spending more money will have a better chance of election.

It is important to control for a number of other variables that, while not representing important alternative hypotheses, were likely to affect a candidate’s chance of victory. (4) *Opponent Inherits*: whether an opponent of the candidate had “inherited” the seat from a family member in the district. Candidates facing someone who inherited the district family seat will be much less likely to win the seat. (5) *Weak Inherit*: whether the candidate had a close relative who was an incumbent in the district going into the 1996 election, but did not win the new SMD seat. (6) *Ran in 96*: whether the candidate ran in the same district in 1996. Some “new” candidates are not entirely new—they may not have held HR seats in the past, but they may have run losing campaigns for HR office before. I expect that candidates who ran before (even if they lost) will have created some base and will be more likely to win than those who have not yet run in the district. (7) *Urban*: three-point scale indicating the district’s level of urban-ness.<sup>2</sup> A score of 1 indicates very rural districts, 3 indicates very urban districts, and 2 indicates something more mixed. Voters in urban areas tend to be more issue-oriented, and their ties to long-term incumbents are typically looser than for voters in rural areas. Moreover, displeasure with the status quo appears substantially greater in urban areas (Scheiner 1999). New candidates should be more likely to win in urban areas. (8) *Incumbent Opponent*: coded 1 if the new candidate

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<sup>1</sup> I experimented with a number of different measures of coordination failure, including the total number of candidates and the number of candidates from each bloc as separate measures (and also used similar measures where I also divided the number of candidates in each bloc by the total number of candidates). Ultimately, the measure I chose to employ here made the greatest logical sense, but the results *in all cases* were roughly the same.

<sup>2</sup> Great thanks to Kabashima Ikuo who provided the measure, which is based on population density (DID).

faced an incumbent in the district and 0 if not. (9) *Major Incumbent Opponent*: coded 1 if the new candidate faced an incumbent from either the LDP or DPJ and 0 if not. New candidates facing incumbents, especially from major parties, will be less likely to win.

In the first column of results in Table 5.5, I group all of the quality categories into a single “quality” variable, which is positive and statistically significant. “Quality” candidates were more likely to win. In the second column of results in Table 5.5, I disaggregate quality into a series of 0-1 dummy variables that indicate the candidates’ career history more specifically: (1) *Local*, coded 1 if the candidate was a former city mayor or prefectural assembly member. (2) *HC*, coded 1 if the candidate was a former HC member. (3) *Bureaucrat*, coded 1 if the candidate was a former member of a national level bureaucratic ministry. (4) *TV*, coded 1 if the candidate was a former television reporter. (5) *Inherit*, coded 1 if the candidate inherited the district from a close relative.

As expected, the coefficient on every single category of quality candidates is positive and statistically significant. For the purposes of my analysis here, the significance of the Local variable is particularly noteworthy. Former local office holders were, all else being equal, more likely to win their HR race than non-quality candidates.

The results of the remaining key variables are largely as expected. Facing a major party incumbent is a substantial obstacle for new candidates. Interestingly, Campaign Expenditures and Coordination Failure are both non-significant. Spending does not play a discernible role in electing new candidates and Coordination Failure did not play an important part in new candidate loss. Finally, LDP is non-significant. Once controlling for other factors, in particular candidate quality, LDP candidates have no advantage in district races.

[Tables 6.2 and 6.3 about here]<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The coefficients for the non-Local quality variables are larger than the coefficient for Local. This is most likely due to the fact that there are far fewer cases in the other variables, so each case of victory exerts greater influence on the size of the coefficient. In contrast to the 30 former local politicians, there were only 14 bureaucrats, five former HC members, and four television newscasters.

**Table 6.1 – Probit Model of New Candidate Success in 2000 (LDP and DPJ)**

<i>Variables</i>	<b>Aggregated Model</b>		<b>Disaggregated Model</b>	
	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>(Std. Er.)</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>(Std. Er.)</b>
Quality	1.162	(0.280)***		
Former Local Politician			0.723	(0.339)**
HC			1.533	(0.715)**
Bureaucrat			1.561	(0.471)***
TV			1.749	(0.863)**
Inherit			a	
LDP	-0.486	(0.315)	-0.509	(0.330)
Coordination Failure	-0.035	(0.154)	-0.051	(0.160)
Campaign Expenditures	0.774	(0.827)	0.341	(1.205)
Opponent Inherits	b		b	
Weak Inherit	1.043	(0.821)	1.123	(0.823)
Ran in 96	0.549	(0.290)*	0.540	(0.298)*
Urban	0.278	(0.153)*	0.335	(0.162)**
Incumbent Opponent	-0.430	(0.357)	-0.295	(0.382)
Major Incumbent Opponent	-0.851	(0.294)***	-0.788	(0.301)***
Constant	-1.124	(0.573)**	-1.258	(0.675)*
N	191		184	
Percent Correctly Predicted	79.0		88.7	
Goodman-Kruskal $\lambda$ (PRE)	.222		.267	
Chi-sq	54.14		42.87	
Prob>chi-sq	0.0000		0.0000	
Pseudo R-sq	.2596		.2287	
Log Likelihood	-77.206		-72.278	

\*p<.05 (one-tail), \*\*p<.05 (two-tail), \*\*\*p<.01 (two-tail)

a In all 7 cases in which they inherited the SMD from a family member, new candidates won the SMD.

b In all 4 cases in which candidate's (new candidate) opponent "inherited" the SMD, the opponent won the SMD.

**Table 6.3 – Likelihood of New Candidate Victory in SMDs in 2000 HR Election**

	<b>Non-Quality</b>	<b>Former Local Office Holder</b>
<b>Runs Against LDP or DPJ Incumbent</b>	5.7%	19.5%
<b>No Incumbent Opponent</b>	30.1%	58.9%

Based on the probit results listed in Table 6.2. All non-Local “quality” variables held constant at 0 and all other variables held constant at their means.