

Appendix 8a – Things cut for space reasons from Chapter 8

Parallel Party Systems

Some even within the ruling party began to say that the LDP has turned completely into a rural party (Asahi Shinbun, online version, June 29, 2000).

Differences between Urban and Rural Areas and Voters Supporting the Different Parties

With regard to the characteristics listed in Table 8.1, with the exception of decentralization, the difference between urban and rural areas is statistically significant at the .05 level. And the differences between those supporting the different parties is also significant at the .05 level.

With regard to the support politicians gave to prompt deregulation, there is a statistically significant (at the .01 level) difference between urban and rural legislators.

The old Left was much less likely to make reform appeals than the other parties. “There was no discernible difference between the LDP and new opposition’s support for “reform,” but urban candidates were more likely than rural candidates to mention reform.” This is in line with the Reed and Scheiner (2003) finding that in the year leading up to the LDP’s 1993 split, electorally insecure, junior LDP members from urban districts were particularly likely to support reform.

Multinomial Probit Analysis

Analysis of the SMD vote: Voters were more likely to support an old Left candidate when there was a Socialist or Communist incumbent running in the district and were less likely to support the old Left candidate when a new party or LDP incumbent was running in the district. The presence of an old Left incumbent appears to have had no effect on the likelihood of voting for an LDP candidate. Not surprising, union members were more likely to support old Left parties.

The main differences between the MNP results for SMD and PR balloting were: (1) While union membership did not appear to affect whether a voter chose the LDP or candidates from new parties in the SMD race, union members were more likely to vote for new parties in PR. This result makes sense, as many unions were affiliated with the NFP and DPJ as parties, but not necessarily with many of their candidates. (2) While having no discernible effect on voters’ choices regarding the old Left in SMD races, support for decentralization was negatively related to support for the old Left in the PR voting. That is, voters supporting decentralization were more likely to vote for new parties, rather than for the old Left in PR races. (3) Unlike the SMD tier, where voters were more likely to vote for incumbent politicians, the presence of incumbent politicians had little influence on voters’ support for a particular party in PR balloting. This suggests that SMD candidates’ personal popularity did not necessarily help the parties in PR balloting. (This last finding runs counter to Mizusaki and Mori’s (1998) finding, based on municipality level vote shares, which indicate the presence of candidates as helping parties win additional PR votes.)

Although my MNP and MNL analysis does not indicate that the presence of SMD incumbents usually improves the chances of a party winning PR votes, Mizusaki and Mori’s (1998) analysis indicates that simply having SMD candidacies may help parties win larger numbers of PR votes.

Number of Incumbents in 1996

See Figure 8.a for the number of incumbents running for the LDP and new parties in 1996 in SMDS. The total number of incumbents here exceeds the 300 SMDs. 1996 was Japan's first under the new HR system and, coming from a multi-member district system that had contained 512 representatives. In many districts multiple incumbents ran against one another, in many instances in addition to running as dual candidates in the PR component of the new system.

Figure 8.a – Number of Incumbents in HR SMDs in 1996 (by Party)

