

Appendix 9b – Party Organization Information and Table

Tables 9.a and 9.b introduce a variety of information relating to the unification of the DPJ's prefectural organizations. Table 9.a lists, in descending order of relative success, the 9 prefectures in which the DPJ outpolled the LDP in PR balloting in the 2000 HR election. Table 9.b lists the 38 in which the LDP did better.¹ In each table, the first column gives the name of each prefecture. The second column gives the difference between the DPJ and LDP PR vote in the 2000 HR election. High positive values indicate that the DPJ did much better than the LDP, while large negative values indicate the opposite. The third column, *Order of Unification*, indicates how quickly the DPJ's organization unified in the prefecture relative to the other prefectures. For example, Nagano Prefecture's DPJ organization was the 14th (out of 47 total prefectures) to unify. The fourth column, *No. of Parties Unifying*, indicates the number of different parties holding national Diet members who joined the DPJ within the prefecture. For example, in Hokkaido, Diet members from two different parties joined the DPJ. Finally, the last column indicates the number of electoral "errors" made by the opposition (and, in parentheses, the number of seats the LDP won) in the prefecture. This column represents the number of additional seats the non-Communist opposition could have taken from the LDP if the opposition as a whole had pooled all its SMD votes behind a single candidate.

[Tables 9.a and 9.b about here]

From the bottom set of prefectures in Table 9.b, it is clear that, by and large, the DPJ unified quite late in the prefectures in which it had the weakest base. The average unification rank in the ten prefectures in which the DPJ was least successful relative to the LDP in PR balloting was 34th. On the whole, however, it does not appear that order of unification had much to do with electoral success. Looking at Table 9.a, where the DPJ found its greatest electoral success, the average order of unification was 20th. In short, the DPJ did not unify terribly quickly in places where the likely benefits were the highest.

Impact on Coordination Problems

The result can be seen in my reporting of the number of opposition errors, the last column in Tables 9.a and 9.b. The column lists for each prefecture the number of additional SMDs the non-Communist opposition could have taken from the LDP had the opposition pooled its votes in each district in the 2000 HR election. The number of seats the LDP did win in the prefecture is listed in the parentheses. As Table 7.1 indicates, out of 57 SMDs that the LDP won in the nine

¹ Electoral success or failure in the 2000 HR election is not an ideal proxy for benefits to the DPJ from unifying, since unification occurred well before the 2000 HR election and we cannot attribute perfect foresight to DPJ members. However, the correlations between DPJ success in 2000 and success by members of the DPJ in earlier years (especially the 1998 HC election) are quite high, therefore suggesting that DPJ members had a good sense of likely success in the future if they simply extrapolated based on 1998 success. In short, the party's success in 2000 could be predicted in advance with a fair degree of certainty. Moreover, using results from 2000 is particularly useful for when I discuss below the problems the party had in coordinating between various opposition groups, both in and out of the DPJ, in the 2000 HR election, the first truly important one in the DPJ's early history.

prefectures where the DPJ did particularly well at the polls, greater coordination on the opposition side could have netted the DPJ and its mates as many as 17 additional seats, or an improved yield of roughly 30 percent of all seats the LDP won in those areas. In contrast, out of 120 SMDs won by the LDP in the remaining prefectures, better coordination would have yielded only an additional 12 DPJ seats (just a 10 percent improvement). Moreover, 7 of those 12 were in prefectures where the DPJ was made up of multiple pre-existing parties.

**Table 9.a – DPJ Success, Unification of Prefectural Organizations and Electoral Errors:
Prefectures Where the DPJ Outpolled the LDP in PR Balloting**

Prefecture	PR Vote: DPJ-LDP	Order of Unification	No. of Parties Unifying	Opp. Errors (LDP Wins)
Nagano	14.13	14	2	1 (3)
Tokyo	9.53	16	5	3 (8)
Aichi	7.49	45	4	2 (5)
Kanagawa	6.27	11	4	4 (9)
Hokkaido	5.68	2	2	1 (7)
Hyogo	1.96	22	2	1 (3)
Osaka	1.96	36	4	2 (8)
Saitama	1.19	25	3	1 (6)
Fukuoka	1.06	10	3	2 (8)

Source: DPJ party documents, information in Kokusei Jōhō Sentā (1998), and results from the 2000 HR election.

Key

--PR Vote: Represents the proportion of the PR vote in the prefecture won by the DPJ minus that won by the LDP.

--Order of Unification: How quickly the DPJ's organization unified in the prefecture. (E.g., a score of "2" indicates that it was the second DPJ prefectural organization to unify.)

--No. of Parties Unifying: Indicates the number of HR or HC incumbents who came from different parties to unify the DPJ in the prefecture. (E.g., in a prefecture where the party was unified by a merger between DPJ incumbents, with one or more originally from the LDP and one or more from the JSP, this column would read "2.")

--Opp. Errors (LDP Wins): Indicates the number of SMDs the opposition would have won in the district had all non-Communist opposition parties pooled their votes in the district (with the number of seats the LDP actually did win in parentheses).

Table 9.b – DPJ Success, Unification of Prefectural Organizations and Electoral Errors: Prefectures Where the LDP Outpolled the DPJ in PR Balloting

Prefecture	PR Vote: DPJ-LDP	Order of Unification	No. of Parties Unifying	Opp. Errors (LDP Wins)
Mie	-0.14	23	2	0 (2)
Shizuoka	-0.21	12	2	0 (4)
Nara	-0.39	8	2	1 (4)
Chiba	-0.95	17	1	2 (7)
Miyagi	-2.57	3	1	0 (2)
Yamanashi	-3.20	37	0	0 (2)
Shiga	-5.21	21	2	0 (2)
Kyoto	-5.25	19	2	2 (5)
Tokushima	-6.20	33	1	0 (2)
Fukushima	-7.33	13	1	1 (3)
Yamaguchi	-7.92	27	0	0 (3)
Ibaragi	-7.94	5	1	0 (5)
Gifu	-8.68	43	0	0 (5)
Wakayama	-10.75	44	0	0 (1)
Nagasaki	-11.07	32	0	0 (2)
Tochigi	-11.09	4	1	0 (4)
Akita	-11.78	7	1	1 (3)
Kumamoto	-11.82	20	0	0 (2)
Oita	-13.42	1	1	0 (2)
Hiroshima	-13.69	24	0	0 (5)
Aomori	-14.17	47	0	0 (3)
Iwate	-15.36	6	0	0 (1)
Niigata	-15.44	40	1	2 (4)
Saga	-15.62	18	1	1 (3)
Kochi	-15.87	26	1	0 (3)
Okayama	-16.12	29	1	0 (5)
Okinawa	-16.76	34	1	0 (1)
Tottori	-16.95	15	0	0 (2)
Ehime	-17.45	46	0	0 (4)
Shimane	-18.17	38	1	0 (3)
Kagawa	-19.44	28	0	0 (2)
Fukui	-19.99	42	1	0 (3)
Yamagata	-20.09	9	1	0 (3)
Gumma	-21.04	30	0	0 (5)
Miyazaki	-21.28	41	0	1 (3)
Ishikawa	-22.08	35	2	0 (3)
Toyama	-23.50	39	0	1 (3)
Kagoshima	-27.00	31	1	0 (4)

Source: DPJ party documents, information in Kokusei Jōhō Sentā (1998), and results from the 2000 HR election.

Key: See Table 9.a.

