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Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics: A Structural History of National and Dyadic Conflict, 1816–1992

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Can we put labels on states due to their history of conflict involvement? Popular folklore as well as the rhetoric of politicians suggests that we can. Germany up to the end of World War II and Japan in the same period were labeled "revisionist" or "aggressive" states. President Reagan called the Soviet Union "the Evil Empire," due to its seemingly expansionist ideology, but also due to its presumably aggressive behavior. Israel is often depicted by many of its neighbors and other countries in and outside the Middle East as "inherently expansionist." These examples suggest a notion that states can somehow be structurally characterized, independently of specific policies, leaders, political parties or regimes in power, economic and social conditions.

If we can label states in structural terms, we can also label pairs or groups of states. For example, President George W. Bush branded North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as the "Axis of Evil," due to these countries' pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. The Clinton administration identified Syria, Iran, and Iraq as a destabilizing axis in the Middle East, confronting the latter two through a policy of dual containment. The scholarly literature on international politics has identified structural patterns of warring or conflicting dyads through such concepts as protracted conflict, intractable conflicts, and—more analytically defined—the concept of enduring rivalries (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Maoz and Mor 2002).

How scientifically sound are such labels? More importantly, are such labels helpful in understanding the causes, courses, and consequences of international conflicts? In other areas of human and social inquiry, structural characterization of units is of immense importance. Genetic research clearly indicates that certain people are far more prone to some diseases than others. Research on addiction attempts to identify structural propensities of drug or alcohol abuse. Research on recidivism in criminology is intent on identifying structural propensities for crime. Research on poverty systematically identifies structural characteristics including individual, family, and even national correlates of poverty.

This study is motivated by the following empirical observation about international conflict: the distribution of national and dyadic conflict involvement during the last two centuries reveals extreme inequalities. A substantial number of states have engaged in little or no conflict with other states, while a small group of states has participated in a disproportionately high fraction of all conflicts. Likewise, a substantial number of politically relevant dyads—dyads that are expected by virtue of their geographic proximity or span of strategic interests to be highly conflict prone—turn out to have little or no conflict experience over their joint history. On the other hand, a handful of dyads are responsible for most of the conflict activity in the international system.

This observation runs contrary to both explicit and implicit notions about international conflict in the literature. Studies influenced by realist conceptions assert that conflict is an endemic feature of international anarchy. Hence, it follows that every state—if it survives long enough—is bound to get involved in militarized interstate

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disputes and wars. Likewise, if two states have the opportunity (Most and Starr 1989) by virtue of their geographical or strategic contact and if both share a sufficiently long stretch of history, they are bound to fight each other at some point (Waltz 1979:113).

The assumption that there is basic equality (or "normalcy") in conflict-involvement patterns is implicit in most of the quantitative analyses of international conflict, which assumes a normal, log-normal, or Poisson distribution of the dependent variable. Nathaniel Beck, Gary King, and Langche Zeng (2000) point out that these assumptions are tenuous and that significant bias in the findings may result from relying upon them.

The fundamental inequality in national and dyadic patterns of conflict involvement may require us to redefine our approach to the study of conflict. Instead of examining why states fight in general, we need to explore what makes some states fundamentally pacifist in their international relations while others tend to be substantially conflict prone. Likewise, we need to investigate why some dyads fight repeatedly while others do not fight at all.

Perhaps one of the most important implications of an "unnatural" distribution of conflicts over states and dyads is that we must deal with structural characteristics of specific groups of states rather than treat all states alike. For example, if there are identifiable groups of states or dyads that are pacifist, it would be improper to examine them in the same terms that we study conflict-prone states or dyads. However, identifying some states (or some dyads) as pacifist and other states (or dyads) as conflict prone does not mean much unless we can systematically differentiate them in terms of other properties that are related to their conflict proneness or pacifism.

Accordingly, the underlying aims of the present study are fourfold:

1. To explore long-term patterns of national and dyadic conflict involvement.
2. To classify states and dyads into distinct "risk" groups in terms of their dispute and war-involvement patterns.
3. To identify the principal characteristics of states and dyads making up each of the risk groups in terms of their conflict involvement.
4. To identify some preliminary correlates of the structural conflict propensity of states and dyads.

This study focuses on the conceptualization and identification of structural patterns of conflict, not on a theory thereof. In subsequent studies I will explore the factors that account for the location of states or dyads in each of these risk groups, or their move across the various groups over time.

The present study is designed as follows. Section two describes the distribution of militarized interstate disputes and wars over the entire history of nations and dyads and discusses the implications of these patterns. Section three defines the concepts of pacifism, conflict proneness, and conflict-related addiction (or fightaholism) in the context of other types of compulsive-obsessive behaviors, such as substance abuse, recidivism, and behavioral addictions. Section four offers an empirical description of these structural patterns of conflict and some of the typical correlates of these risk groups. Section five discusses the implications of these issues for theories of international politics and conflict theory. (The research design is given in the appendix.)

The Inequality of Conflict: National and Dyadic Patterns

Some Observations about Units of Analysis in Conflict Research

Many studies of conflict employ the unit-year as their principal unit of observation. The typical unit of observation is the nation-year (e.g., Maoz 1993, 2001),[1] or the

[1]Other investigators (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 1996, 1997; Henderson 1998) hsve used the nation-decade or the nation-half-decade as their unit of observation.

dyad-year (e.g., Bremer 1992, 1993; Maoz and Russett 1993; Thompson and Tucker 1997; Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Russett and Oneal 2001). The unit-year scheme is designed to deal with the questions of "who gets involved in conflict when" or "who fights whom when." This approach has yielded important insights (e.g., Bremer 2000). However, this scheme prevents detection of structural patterns of conflict that can be conceptualized only within a temporal framework covering the entire history of the unit. Testing for structural patterns of national and dyadic conflict involvement requires long-term observation.

Studies on conflict-related structural properties of states or dyads are quite rare. Quincy Wright (1944) briefly discussed the war-proneness of states. J. David Singer and Melvin Small (1972; see also Small and Singer 1982), Charles Gochman and Zeev Maoz (1984), and Maoz (1993) provide descriptive statistics of national war and dispute proneness. More recently, the enduring rivalry literature (Goertz and Diehl 1992, 1993; Diehl and Goertz 2000; Maoz and Mor 2002) has provided structural information on the more dispute-prone dyads. Other studies have attempted to identify potentially addictive patterns (e.g., Bremer 1980; Most and Starr 1980). However, we still lack a good understanding of these tendencies as well as of some of their causes and correlates. Thus, a study of these issues appears timely.

National Conflict Involvement Patterns

The extent of inequality in the conflict involvement of states and dyads is analogous to income inequality in societies. If all states were equally conflict prone, then the least conflict-prone states would account for a similar proportion of systemic conflict as the most conflict-prone states. If the distribution of conflicts over states were normal, the cumulative distribution would provide us some approximation to the line of perfect equality. Figure 1 presents empirical patterns of national conflict involvement over the 1816–1992 period.

This figure suggests a fundamental inequality in the structure of national conflict patterns: a small number of states accounts for a disproportionate amount of conflict in the system while a large number of states evidence very little conflict.[2] Nearly 11 percent of all states with twenty or more years of independence were not involved in any Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) at all. Nearly 57 percent of all states were not involved in any war. At the other end of the scale, the top 10 percent of the states accounted for 49.7 percent of all MIDs, and for 56.8 percent of all wars in the system.[3]

Dyadic Conflict Involvement Patterns

Inferences from the analyses conducted at the national level may be highly misleading. States that are peace-prone are benign with respect to all other states; if one avoids fights, one avoids fights with everybody equally. However, at the dyadic level, states may not distribute their conflict activity uniformly over partners. If each of two states is conflict prone, it does not follow that the dyad made up of these two states would also be conflict prone. If state A fights with states C, D, E, F . . . and state B fights states Q, R, S, T . . . , then both states may be individually conflict prone while the dyad itself is pacific. Thus, the distribution of conflicts over dyads may

[2]Normalized figures for the distribution control for the length of a state's national history. The unnormalized distributions of conflicts yield huge inequalities with Gini coefficients of 0.74 for MIDs and 0.85 for Wars. Similar analyses were conducted for shorter stretches of time such as half-decades with nearly identical results. See appendix for details.

[3]Matching the distributions of national MID and war involvement patterns with a Poisson distribution yields extremely high chi-square values (for MIDs, the chi-square is over 63,000 with 9 DF and for war the chi-square is 889), suggesting strong evidence for addiction.



FIG. 1. Lorenz Curve of National Conflict Involvement, 1816–1992 (normalized by length of national history).

be significantly different from the distribution of conflicts over individual states. Figure 2 shows the distribution of MIDs and wars over politically relevant dyads.

This figure suggests that states tend to be extremely "selective" in their choices of enemies. A majority of all politically relevant dyads (57 percent) never have exercised threats, displays, or uses of force. Almost 87 percent of all politically relevant dyads never fought a war. On the other hand, the upper centile of the dyads accounted for 34 percent of all MIDs and for *over 95 percent of all interstate wars for this population*.

Implications

So what if the national and dyadic distributions of conflict are not normally or Poisson distributed? Many social phenomena are not normally distributed. The use of international flights, the amount of money invested in stock exchanges by people or firms, the ownership of golf clubs, and many other trivial patterns of behavior display highly similar distributions to the ones discussed above. The fact that the distribution of national and dyadic patterns of conflict involvement is highly unequal may be neither surprising nor of significant import.



FIG. 2. Lorenz Curve of Dyadic Conflict Involvement, 1816–1992 (normalized by year of joint dyadic history).

While it is true that a great deal of trivial social and natural phenomena exhibit substantial inequalities among units, it is also true of other, possibly less trivial, patterns of deviant social behavior, such as the use of drugs and alcohol, the involvement in criminal behavior, overeating, and obsessive overuse of certain habits during leisure time (e.g., computers, television). One of the potential implications of such skewed distributions of deviant behavior is that they are harmful not only to the person engaged in them, but also to his/her environment.

The significance of the structural distributions of conflict involvement lies principally in the following argument: our treatment of all states or dyads as if they were a priori equally conflict prone is tenuous and making this assumption—implicitly or explicitly—in our studies may yield biased inferences. More generally, if we view conflict involvement as self- and environmentally harmful, then the fundamental inequality in the distribution of conflict carries important implications for the study and prevention of conflict. Since conflict is a deviant behavior, the fact that a substantial proportion of all states and dyads systematically abstains from conflict suggests a substantial lacuna in our knowledge. Specifically, we have *a substantial phenomenon of pacifism in world politics*, but we do not know what the characteristics of pacifist states and pacifist dyads are. The classification of states and dyads into low- and high-conflict risk-groups may enrich our understanding both of the causes and the consequences of conflict behavior.

Pacifism, Conflict Proneness, and Fightaholism: A Conceptual Exploration

I now turn to a discussion of three basic concepts that guide this study. These concepts are interrelated, but each possesses distinctive features. The concepts of pacifism and conflict proneness are self-explanatory. The concept of conflict-related addiction or fightaholism is used as a metaphor for a structural pattern of behavior not tapped by the other concepts. I discuss these concepts in this section.

Pacifism is an absolute concept. It refers to the *absolute* lack of conflict involvement *given sufficient opportunity*. At the national level, an opportunity for conflict exists if a state has a minimal number of immediate neighbors and if it has existed as an independent system member for a sufficient amount of time. At the dyadic level, opportunity is defined by the notion of political relevance (Maoz and Russett 1993; Maoz 1996) and by a minimum amount of time of common history, that is, by a sufficient number of years of joint national existence.[4] If a state was involved in a single dispute or war over its entire history, it can no longer be branded as pacifist.

A national commitment to avoid conflict is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for pacifism. Other states must also avoid conflict with the focal state. Switzerland, Holland, and Belgium wanted to avoid war in World War I and World War II, thus declaring neutrality. Yet Germany respected the neutrality of the former, but not of the latter two states. Dyadic pacifism is perhaps more meaningful. A pacifist dyad is one wherein both states systematically avoid militarized conflicts with one another. I distinguish between dispute pacifism and war pacifism. A dispute pacifist is a state/dyad that has experienced no militarized disputes during its entire history. A war pacifist is a state/dyad that has never engaged in an interstate war during its entire history.

Conflict proneness refers to the number of conflict involvements per year of national or dyadic existence. This concept distinguishes between states that have been involved in a large number of conflicts and those that have been involved in few conflicts. Dividing by the number of years of existence normalizes for the temporal opportunity for conflict. By definition, the conflict involvement score of dispute or war pacifists is zero.

[4]The notion of "opportunity" in terms of geographical proximity may be problematic. Nevertheless, it is frequently used in the literature (e.g., Most and Starr 1989; Holsti 1991; Vasquez 1993).

The concept *conflict-related addiction (fightaholism)* reflects the evolution of conflict involvement over time. Two states may have identical conflict-proneness scores but their patterns of involvement may take on dramatically different forms over time. For example, only about 18 percent of US militarized interstate disputes and 10.7 percent of its wars were fought in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, 59 percent of Mexico's MIDs and all of its wars were in the nineteenth century. Moreover, all except one of the 25 MIDs between the US and Mexico took place before 1920. More generally, one state may have distributed its conflicts uniformly over time, whereas another may have experienced a short and extremely intense period of conflict while the rest of its history may have been relatively pacific.

To capture conflict proneness over distinct phases of states' or dyads' histories, I have developed the notion of *conflict-related addiction, or fightaholism*. As noted, this concept is based on a metaphor derived from other types of deviant behaviors. Clearly, the metaphoric representation of any concept is necessarily imperfect. I do not mean to suggest that certain states or dyads are addicted to conflict in the exact same manner that some people are addicted to drugs, alcohol, or tobacco. Nor do I mean to imply that conflict creates chemical reactions and feelings of craving and psychological dependence as do certain substances. Rather, the behavioral implications of addiction or other kinds of obsessive-compulsive disorders are similar or analogous to the behavioral patterns of conflict involvement of some states and dyads over time.

In order to explore this metaphor, we must define different types of obsessive-compulsive disorders and examine how they are diagnosed. These disorders include various types of substance (drug, alcohol, tobacco) abuse that involve chemical as well as psychological dependence. But they also include food addiction, sexual addiction, compulsory gambling, workaholism, and addiction to television or computers, as well as obsessive criminal behavior. The latter denote behaviors that are based primarily on psychological dependence. Clearly, these types of addiction are extremely diverse. However, they share a number of traits that are included in the general definition of obsessive-compulsive behavior that places most of them under the label of *addiction*.

> Addiction is a dependence, on a behavior or substance, that a person is powerless to stop . . . Addiction has been extended, however, to include mood-altering behaviors or activities. Some researchers speak of two types of addictions: substance addictions (for example, alcoholism, drug abuse, and smoking); and process addictions (for example, gambling, spending, shopping, eating, and sexual activity). There is a growing recognition that many addicts, such as polydrug abusers, are addicted to more than one substance or process. (Fray 2001:50)

It is commonly noted that "the main characteristic of addictive behavior is the compelling need to engage in a particular activity or to use the addictive substance *without deriving pleasure of it, and despite awareness of the damage caused by this activity to oneself and to his or her family, friends, or co-workers*" (Larson 1996:1129, emphasis added).

The elements of this general definition are visible in definitions of specific types of addiction. Substance addiction is defined as excessive use of a certain substance over a relatively long period of time. What *excessive* is depends on the nature of the substance. With regard to some substances, for example, alcohol, nicotine, or certain "softer" drugs, addiction severity is a function of three factors: social norms, the extent of deviation from the norm, and the period of use.[5]

[5]The measurement of addiction in relation to a certain "norm" is very problematic. First, the "norm" itself might vary across socieities. For example, the "norm" of alcohol use in Russia, France, and Italy is different from Iran and Saudi Arabia. (See the figures on the cross-national differences in alcohol use in Clarke and Weisburd 1990:11.) Second, the norm may change over time. This, for example, was the case with nicotine and drug abuse in most Western societiess over the last three decades (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990:40).

These definitions of addictive behavior identify five common traits that can be compared to the notion of fightaholism discussed below:

1. Excessive and repetitive engagement in a given activity.
2. The activity may cause some sort of immediate gratification, but it possesses some elements that are harmful to oneself as well as to one's environment.
3. Awareness that this behavior is self-damaging does not inhibit continuous engagement in it.
4. Addiction is a self-reinforcing behavior. It may be induced by chemical craving, by psychological dispositions, or even by rational reasoning.[6]
5. Efforts to discontinue this activity or to reduce the level of engagement in it are brief and unsuccessful.

Addictive behavior is typically deviant. The number of people diagnosed as drug, alcohol, nicotine, or food addicts or as compulsive gamblers (and even recidivists) is generally small in the entire population, but their rates of consumption of substances or practice of the activities is disproportionately high. Thus, the study of addiction focuses on a small number of individuals rather than on general characteristics of a population due to the unequal distribution of deviance in the general population.

Analogously, *fightaholism* is defined as *excessive and repetitive engagement in militarized disputes and wars over a long period of time with occasionally harmful consequences*. At the dyadic level, we define *dyadic fightaholism* as *repeated and excessive engagement in militarized disputes and war with the same partner over a long period of time, again with harmful consequences that accrue to both members of the dyad. This behavior is accompanied by policies that facilitate the conduct of conflict, such as militarization or alliance formation*.

The definitions of these concepts allow us to classify states or dyads into four risk groups regarding their conflict-related propensity:

1. **Pacifists.** Those states or dyads that did not engage in any conflict throughout their history.
2. **Normal.** States or dyads that have engaged in relatively little sporadic conflict during their history and whose rate of conflict involvement over time has been sporadic.[7]
3. **Conflict prone.** States or dyads that have engaged in relatively high amounts of conflict during their history but whose conflict history is sporadic rather than sustained.
4. **Fightaholics.** States or dyads that have engaged in excessively high amounts of conflict in a sustained manner over their history.

The first three groups are mutually exclusive. The final group largely—but not completely—overlaps with the conflict-prone group. All fightaholics are conflict prone, but not all conflict-prone states or dyads are fightaholics. In the next section, we discuss the empirical properties of these four groups.

[6]Some theories of gambling and recedivism facilitate the application of rational decision or game theoretic concepts to such processes. For example, sunk cost paradoxes in the Dollar Auction game and cost benefit calculations in criminal behavior (where the probability of capture is discounted in the planning of later crimes than in early ones due to experience and learning) suggest that even people who perform rational-like calculations can become addicted to self-damaging behavior (see Maltz 1984 on recidivism, Brockner and Rubin 1985 on social entrapment in a wide array of situations, and Maoz 1990 on sunk-cost paradoxes in war).

[7]The notion of "normal dyads" is equivalent to what Diehl and Goertz (2000) and Maoz and Mor (2002) call "proto rivalries."

Identifying Pacifism, Conflict Proneness, and Fightaholism

General Empirical Properties of Structural Conflict Behavior

Pacifism. As noted above, the empirical identification of pacifism is relatively straightforward. However, the probability of national and dyadic pacifism is related to the length of a state's/dyad's history; the longer the existence of states/dyads as independent system members, the less likely they are to stay pacifist. Figure 3 provides some sense of the distribution of national and dyadic pacifism patterns by years of independence.

Figure 3 suggests that about 9 percent of all states with at least 20 to 50 years of system membership were MID pacifist. However, none of the states with 50 or more years of system membership absolutely avoided MID involvement. If states live long enough, they end up getting involved in MIDs of one form or another. War-related pacifism, however, is observed at some level even for states with varying lengths of national histories. More than 55 percent of the states with histories extending for at least 40 years completely abstained from war. For "older" states, this proportion levels off at an average of 15 percent regardless of the length of national history.

About 58 percent of the politically relevant dyads with 20 or more years of joint history are pacifists. This proportion drops to a rate of 32 percent MID-pacifism for dyads with 50 to 80 years of joint history. It levels off at an average rate of 20 percent for dyads with 80 or more years of joint history. More significantly, *regardless of the length of joint history, 71 percent of all politically relevant dyads never fought each other in an interstate war.*

Thus, in contrast to the realist notion that conflict is a pervasive phenomenon in world politics, pacifism turns out to be a significant phenomenon in an anarchic world, and it calls for explanation.

Conflict Proneness. On the national level, there is no discernable increase in conflict proneness over time. While a regression of MID and war proneness on length of history yielded statistically significant effects, the coefficients were fairly low for both measures of conflict ($b = .004$, $R^2 = 0.056$ for MID proneness, and $b = .0008$, $R^2 = 0.026$ for wars—$N = 180$). This suggests only a small effect of duration in the system on the increase in rate of conflict proneness for individual states.



FIG. 3. National and Dyadic Pacifism: Proportion of all states with zero conflict involvement by number of years of national independence.

TABLE 1. Cross-Time Conflict Levels
1.1 A Hypothetical Addiction Table

Level of Conflict involvement		Current Period Level of Conflict Involvement		
		Low	Medium	High
Past Period	Low	Nonadicted	Nonadicted	Possibly Addicted
	Medium	Rehabilitated	Possibly addicted	Addicted
	High	Rehabilitated	Possibly addicted	Addicted

Note: In cells denoted as *possibly addicted* and *addicted*, observed frequencies must be higher than expected frequencies. If that is the case in a given contingency table, the cell is designated as *consistent*. If the reverse is true, the cell is designated as *inconsistent*. In cells denoted as *rehabilitated*, observed frequencies must be smaller than expected frequencies to be designated as *consistent*.

1.2. Examples: National Level Cross TIME RELATIONS

		Level of MID Involvement in Present Decade			
		Low	Medium	High	Row Total
Level of MID involvement in previous decade	**Low**	**470***	**116$^+$**	**70***	**656**
		(356.95)	**(139.41)**	**(159.64)**	
	Medium	**109$^+$**	**72$^+$**	**69$^+$**	**250**
		(136.03)	**(53.13)**	**(60.84)**	
	High	**56$^+$**	**60$^+$**	**145$^+$**	**261**
		(142.02)	**(55.47)**	**(63.52)**	
Column Total		**635**	**248**	**284**	**1,167**
$\chi^2_{(4)} = 260.244$; $p < 0.001$; $m_b = 0.425$					

		Level of MID Involvement in Present Decade			
		Low	Medium	High	Row Total
Level of MID Involvement Two Decades Ago	**Low**	**369***	**100$^+$**	**83***	**552**
		(294.48)	**(117.57)**	**(139.96)**	
	Medium	**105$^+$**	**50$^+$**	**58$^+$**	**213**
		(113.63)	**(43.37)**	**(54.01)**	
	High	**56$^+$**	**60$^+$**	**109$^+$**	**221**
		(117.90)	**(47.07)**	**(56.03)**	
Column Total		**526**	**210**	**250**	**986**
$\chi^2_{(4)} = 136.539$; $p < 0.001$; $m_b = 0.544$					

Note: entries in parentheses are expected frequencies.
*Inconsistent cell.
$^+$Consistent cell.

A similar finding can be reported for the effect of the length of dyadic history on the conflict proneness of the dyad. In the case of MID-proneness, the effect of the length of dyadic history is statistically significant, but the slope is very low ($b = .0002$, $R^2 = 0.003$). For wars this effect is not even statistically significant.

Fightaholism. How do we know that a state or a dyad is fightaholic? In the appendix, I develop a number of measures of conflict-related addiction that build on those bodies of literature. Here, I explore the empirical properties of these measures. A first-cut identification and analysis of conflict-related addiction requires us to examine time-dependence at various levels of conflict involvement.

Such time dependence could be prespecified so that any relationship between conflict-involvement levels at one period and conflict involvement at another period would correspond to the characteristics of addictive behavior discussed above. Table 1 shows how an interpretation of addictive behavior would appear in a contingency table that relates these two periods.

In the top part of this table, we designate the cells that are consistent with the addiction specifications. The presence of addiction in the actual population of states and dyads is based on the extent to which the difference between the observed and expected frequencies in the cells that are designated as possibly addictive or addictive contributes to the overall chi-square of the frequency table.[8] The m_b statistic denotes the proportion of the chi-square accounted for by the addiction hypothesis (Maoz 1996: 130–132). In the example given in part 1.2 of the table, we see that in most of the cells suggesting patterns of addiction, observed frequencies are significantly higher than expected frequencies and in most cells suggesting rehabilitation, observed frequencies are substantially lower than the expected ones, consistent with the hypothesis of addiction-like behavior.

Table 2 provides the cross-time correlations for both national and dyadic addiction levels over a variety of measures.

The results of Table 2 suggest evidence of addiction-like patterns of warfare over time. States and dyads that exhibit disproportionately high levels of conflict involvement during one period tend to be high in conflict in subsequent periods. This trend extends over relatively long time-spans, implying that a state that started its national history as a highly conflict-prone state will maintain its status of addition-like conflict involvement over time.[9]

The measures of fightaholism offered herein apply the five characteristics of addictive behavior to the extent of a state's involvement in MIDs and wars over time. A state/dyad is designated as fightaholic if its involvement in MIDs or wars was far above the national/dyadic average for a given period and if this excessive involvement lasted over a number of periods consistently. Based on this definition we can discuss the relationship between conflict-proneness, fightaholism, and length of tenure in the club of nations.

Similar to conflict proneness, national fightaholism suggests an increasing trend as a function of the length of the state's national history. Less than 30 percent of all states with 40 or less years of history can be labeled fightaholics. However, the 50-year history mark indicates a steep jump in fightaholism. This rate increases gradually to the point where about 58 percent of the states with histories of over 170 years were dispute-related fightaholics, and 50 percent of such states were war-related fightaholics. The rate of dyadic fightaholism increases gradually up to a peak of 35 percent for all dyads with 130 years or less of national independence and declines thereafter. The "old" dyads (with 160 years or more of joint history) exhibit a fightaholism rate of around 30 percent.

Placing States and Dyads in Risk Groups

Having described patterns of pacifism, conflict proneness, and fightaholism, we can now identify the states and dyads that belong to each of these groups. Table 3 shows the major pacifist and the major fightaholic states.

[8]A similar procedure was developed by Most and Starr (1980). The measures below are a more accurate representation of the relationship between conflict measures over time based on an a priori designation of specific cells in the frequency table.

[9]A similar analysis was performed for a five-year period split of national and dyadic history. The associations between rates of conflict involvement over time for that analysis were even higher than those reported here.

TABLE 2. Addiction Levels in MID and War Involvement Rates of States and Dyads, 1816–1992

Variable	MID/War	1-Decade Lag	2-Decades Lag	3-Decades Lag	First Decade $^{\propto}$
1. National MID/War Involvement per Decade					
>No. of Conflicts per Decade	MID	0.425**	0.544**	0.442**	—
	War	0.657**	0.636**	0.605**	
		N = 1,167 $^{+}$	N = 986	N = 810	
1-Decade Lag of No. Conflicts/Decade	MID		0.411**	0.482**	—
	War		0.434**	0.673**	
2-Decade Lag of No. Conflicts/Decade	MID			0.485**	
	War			0.668**	—
No. Conflicts/Year Next-to-Last Decade	MID				0.459**
	War				0.662**
					N = 161
Pearson Correlations, Next-to-Last	MID $^{\propto}$				0.905**
Decade, Relative Conflict Rates	War $^{\propto}$				0.647**
(see appendix)					N = 161

Variable	MID/War	1-Decade Lag	2-Decades Lag	3-Decades Lag	First Decade $^{\propto}$
1. Dyadic MID/War Involvement per Decade					
No. of Conflicts per decade	MID	0.619**	0.604**	0.588**	—
	War	0.617**	0.589**	0.656**	
		N = 5,443 $^{+}$	N = 4,436	N = 3,429	
1-Decade Lag of No. conflicts/Decade	MID		0.651**	0.627**	—
	War		0.645**	0.673**	
2-Decade Lag of No. conflicts/Decade	MID			0.485**	—
	War			0.620**	
No. Conflicts/Year Next-to-Last Decade	MID				0.640**
	War				0.657**
					N = 1,246
Pearson correlations, Next-to-Last	MID $^{\propto}$				0.273**
Decade, relative conflict rates	War $^{\propto}$				0.088*
(see appendix)					N = 546

$^{+}$ Entries in each cell are m_b statistics.
$^{\propto}$ Pearson product moment correlation.
*$p < .01$; **$p < .001$.

From the list in Table 3, it can be said, though with some caution, that most war pacifists are smaller, less-developed states, while MID and War fightaholics seem to be composed of two distinct groups. The first is a group of relatively "young" states (less than 70 years in the system) in the Middle East and East Asia; the second group is made up of major powers. We turn now to identification of pacifist and fightaholic dyads.

The list of pacifist dyads is large and cannot be displayed here. The dyads given here are the ones with the longest history of dyadic pacifism that are also directly contiguous. The geographic content of this list of pacifist dyads is interesting: it consists of Western European and Latin American dyads only. We could not find significant pacifist dyads in Africa, the Middle East, or Asia.

Turning to the list of conflict-prone and fightaholic dyads, we observe a general resemblance in the members of the two lists, but they are not in the same order. We will see below that the correlation between conflict proneness and fightaholism is not as high as could be expected. Here again, the members of the two lists are composed of the same groups of states. It is

TABLE 3. "Oldest" Pacifist States and Most Fightaholic States

Pacifists[1]		MID Fightaholism			War Fightaholism		
State	**No. Years in System**	**State**	**No. Years in System**	**Proportion of Decades Fightaholic**	**State**	**No. Years in System**	**Proportion of Decades Fightaholic**
Sweden	177	Israel	45	1.000	Israel	45	0.800
Switzerland	177	Pakistan	46	1.000	Australia	72	0.625
Venezuela	152	India	46	1.000	Syria	47	0.600
Haiti	116	Jordan	47	1.000	Jordan	47	0.600
Uruguay	111	Syria	47	1.000	South Korea	44	0.600
Tunisia	100	India	46	1.000	Turkey	177	0.444
Dom. Repub.	92	United States	177	0.833	Iraq	61	0.429
Albania	75	(North) Vietnam	39	0.800	China	133	0.429
Liberia	73	South Korea	45	0.800	Ethiopia	91	0.400
Afghanistan[2]	73	North Korea	46	0.786	India	46	0.400
Nepal	73	China	133	0.778	Pakistan	46	0.400
Costa Rica	73	Russia/Sov. Un.	177	0.722	Cambodia	40	0.400
Panama	73	France	174	0.722	(North) Vietnam	39	0.400
Ireland	71	Japan	129	0.714	France	174	0.389
Luxemburg	70	Iraq	61	0.714	United States	177	0.333
Iceland	49	Utd. Kingdom	177	0.667	Bulgaria	85	0.333
Burma (Myn)	45	Zaire	43	0.600	Egypt	84	0.333
Sri Lanka	45	Cambodia	40	0.600	Japan	129	0.286
Indonesia	44	Saudi Arabia	66	0.571	Utd. Kingdom	177	0.278
Taiwan	44	Turkey	177	0.500	Russia/SU	177	0.278

[1]Only war pacifism. Recall that no state with a history of 50 years or more was a MID Pacifist.
[2]Not a pacifist after 2001.

instructive to note, however, that the conflict-proneness and fightaholism lists do not consist of all the typical dyads that are placed in the "enduring rivalries" lists, such as France–Germany, US–USSR, Greece–Turkey, and so forth (e.g., Diehl and Goertz 2000; Thompson 2001; Maoz and Mor 2002). Fightaholism and conflict proneness at the dyadic level are not one and the same as enduring rivalries.

Table 5 provides intercorrelations between these structural patterns of conflict involvement at the national and dyadic level of analysis.

The correlations between the measures of pacifism, conflict proneness, and fightaholism are all statistically significant and generally high on both the national and the dyadic levels of analysis. The correlations between different structural patterns of conflict involvement are not as high as one might expect, given the seemingly similar conceptions of conflict proneness and fightaholism. This suggests that fightaholism—as a structural propensity for excessive involvement in conflict—offers a distinctive characterization of states and dyads. This is notable in addition to the lack of one-to-one empirical correspondence between such concepts as enduring rivalries and dyadic fightaholics.

Correlates of Pacifism, Conflict Proneness, and Fightaholism

Despite the wide array of theories and empirical studies on the correlates of addiction, the literature on substance and behavioral addiction and on chronic

TABLE 4. Selected Pacifist, War Prone, and Fightaholic Dyads

Pacifist Dyads		Dispute Prone Dyads[1]			War Fightaholic Dyads[2]		
Dyad	**No. Years**	**Dyad**	**No. Years**	**MDs/Year**	**Dyad**	**No. Years**	**Fightaholism Score**
Switzerland-Italy	177	Syria-Israel	45	1.011	Egypt-Israel	45	0.800
Sweden-Denmark	175	Egypt-Israel	45	0.813	Jordan-Israel	45	0.700
France-Switzerland	174	North-South Vietnam	22	0.568	Syria-Israel	45	0.600
UK-Belgium	166	India-Pakistan	46	0.541	North-South Korea	44	0.600
Belgium-France	162	Jordan-Israel	45	0.479	China-India	46	0.600
Venezuela-Brazil	155	North-South Korea	44	0.457	India-Pakistan	46	0.600
Brazil-Uruguay	114	Cambodia-Vietnam	21	0.444	Iran-Iraq	61	0.583
Portugal-Morocco	105	US-North Korea	45	0.396	Russia-Japan	131	0.538
US-Argentina	97	Thailand-Cambodia	40	0.372	North-South Vietnam	22	0.500
Sweden-Norway	86	Somalia-Ethiopia	33	0.347	US-North Korea	45	0.500
Finland-Sweden	79	Iran-Iraq	61	0.344	China-(North) Vietnam	39	0.500
Ecuador-Brazil	68	China-India	46	0.327	Iraq-Kuwait	32	0.500
Costa Rica-Colombia	68	Russia-Japan	129	0.315	Iraq-Israel	45	0.500

[1]Average of MID and war proneness (average no. of MIDs and wars for year of joint history).
[2]Average of MID and war Figthaholism (average proportion of decades of joint history with high MID and War fightaholism scores).

TABLE 5. Intercorrelations between Structural Attributes of Conflict Behavior

Variable	MIDs/Year of Independence	Wars/Year of Independence	Relative MID Fightaholic	Prop. Decades MID Fightaholic	Relative War Fightaholic	Prop. Decades War Fightaholic
			National Patterns (N = 180)			
Prop. Peace Years in History	−0.541	−0.351	−0.200	−0.605	−0.182	−0.466
No. MIDs/Year of Independence	—	0.759	0.657	0.866	0.648	0.736
No. Wars/Year of Independence		—	0.516	0.578	0.743	0.662
Relative MID Fightaholism			—	0.506	0.884	0.438
Prop. Decades MID Fightaholic				—	0.475	0.508
Relative War Fightaholic						0.697
			Dyadic Patterns (N = 1,172)			
Prop. Peace Years	−0.959	−0.544	−0.420	−0.882	−0.382	−0.591
MIDs/Year of Independence	—	0.518	0.882	0.810	0.541	0.585
Wars/Year of Independence		—	0.374	0.392	0.844	0.877
Relative MID Fightaholic			—	0.716	0.427	0.441
Prop. Decades MID Fightaholic				—	0.359	0.452
Relative War Fightholic						0.748

Note: All correlations are significant at the $p < .0001$ level.

criminal behavior has identified two basic clusters of correlates of these behaviors: (1) *Intrinsic correlates* are factors associated with the individual's physiology, psychology, or history (both personal and family) and (2) *extrinsic correlates* refer to factors in the individual's social and physical environment that affect the individual's behavior. (See Fray 2001 on the general correlates of a wide variety of drug and behavioral addictions, Teichman 2001 on alcoholism, and Maltz 1984 on recidivism.)

Typical "correlates" of international conflict fit well into this classification. *Intrinsic* correlates of conflict at the national level include national characteristics such as level of power, the (major-regional-minor power) status of the state, its economic development, regime type, political stability, lateral pressure, and so forth (Rosenau 1966; Choucri and North 1975; Bremer 1982; Maoz 1993, 1996, 1997, 2001). *Intrinsic* correlates of dyadic conflict refer to the characteristics of the dyad: its power ratio, its power-related status, its alliance ties, contiguity, economic development, regime type, level of trade, and so forth (Bremer 1982, 1993; Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal et al. 1996; Russett and Oneal 2001).

Extrinsic determinants of conflict focus on the politically relevant international environment (*PRIE*) in which the state resides: the number of states in its *PRIE*, their relative power, number of alliances, level of in the state's environment, the level of stability of the state's environment, and so forth (Maoz 1996, 2001; Ward and Gleditsch 2000). Studies of dyadic conflict have not generally explored extrinsic correlates of conflict. The few exceptions that discuss such correlates focus on factors that are similar to those identified at the monadic level (Bennett 1998; Maoz 2000, 2001).

As noted, this is a preliminary investigation of the correlates of structural location of states and dyads in different risk groups. A more theoretically informed discussion will be presented and tested in a subsequent study. The purpose of the following analysis is to provide some basic indication of potential "causes" of national or dyadic conflict patterns. These causes are derived from the quantitative literature on international conflict that repeatedly uses several basic variables in empirical analysis.[10]

Table 6 includes a selected list of potential correlates that are frequently mentioned in the conflict literature. Since there are some cross-level differences in the measurement of the variables, we can expect cross-level differences in the results. In general, however, the relationship between each of the independent variables and the risk group is expected to be the same across levels of analysis except for the alliance variable. For this variable two different measures are employed at the dyadic level. The first is the number of allies of the state with the fewest allies in the dyad (Maoz 2000; 2001). The second measure denotes whether or not the dyad was allied—as used in most dyadic analyses of conflict.

Because this is an analysis of long-term structural traits of states/dyads, I average most independent variables over time for any given state or dyad. The problem with this procedure is that it may generate biased inferences, because the temporal relationship between the dependent and independent variable is not clear. There are several reasons for justifying this kind of measurement process, however. First, pacifism as an absolute characteristic of a state can only be observed on a long-term basis. Thus, uncovering the correlates of pacifism requires averaging potential factors over long stretches of time. Second, because certain measures (e.g., regime scores, number of states in *PRIE*) are measured both at the point of the state's/dyad's origin and over its entire history, it is possible to compare the results obtained from the averaged measures to the same variables which are unaveraged. If

[10]Discussions can be found in the literature on national and dyadic conflict involvement (e.g., Bremer 1992, 1993; Maoz 1993, 1996, 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993,and chapters in the handbook edited by Midlarsky 2000).

TABLE 6. Potential Correlates of Pacifism, Conflict Proneness, and Fightaholism

Variable	Type of Factor	Definition	Expected Correlation			Sources
			Pacifism	Proneness	Fightaholism	
Military Capability	Intrinsic	**National:** Relative mil. Cap. State/PRIE. **Dyadic:** Capability Ratio (strong/weak)	−	+	+	Maoz (1996), Geller and Singer (1998), Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997)
Power Status	Intrinsic	**National:** Major/Minor Power status. **Dyadic:** Both majors, mixed, both minors.	−	+	+	Singer and Geller (1998: 27); Bremer (1992)
Economic Development	Intrinsic	**National:** Level of economic wealth **Dyadic:** Weak link level of wealth.[1]	−	+	+	Rosenau (1966)
Regime Type at Origin	Intrinsic	**National.** Democracy score. **Dyadic:** Weak link democ. score.	+	−	−	Maoz and Abdolali (1989); Rousseau et al. (1996); Ray (1995); Maoz (2001).
Type of Acquisition of National Independence	Intrinsic	**National.** Revolutionary/ Evolutionary emergence as state. **Dyadic:** Type of dyadic acquisition of inde.	−	+	+	Maoz (1989; 1996), Walt (1996).
Political Instability	Intrinsic	**National.** No. of violent regime changes. **Dyadic:** Weak link regime changes	−	+	+	Levy (1988); Maoz (1996).
No. of States in PRIE	Extrinsic	**National.** Number of contiguous states. **Dyadic.** Weak link no. states	−	+	+	Maoz (1996; 2001); Geller and Singer (1998: 27).
No. of Alliances	Extrinsic	**National.** Number of allies. **Dyadic:** weak link no. of allies; presence/absence of alliance in dyad.	+ ±	−	−	Bremer (1992), Maoz (2000); Geller and Singer (1998)
Conflict in PRIE	Extrinsic	**National:** No. of conflicts in PRIE. **Dyadic:** Weak link No. of conflicts in PRIEs	−	+	+	Maoz (1996; 2000; 2001); Geller and Singer (1998: 27).
Regime in PRIE	Extrinsic	**National:** Average Regime score of PRIE **Dyadic:** Weak link avg. regime of PRIEs	+	−	−	Maoz (1996; 2001)
Dyadic Affinity	Extrinsic	**Dyadic:** Tau-b (S) score of alliance affinity	+	−	−	Bueno de Mesquita (1981); Signorino and Ritter (1998)

TABLE 7. Correlates of Risk Groups (National Level): Pacifism, Conflict Proneness, Fightaholism

	MIDs			War		
Independent Variable	**Pacifism**[+]	**Proneness**	**Fightaholism**[++]	**Pacifism**	**Proneness**	**Fightaholism**
Mil. Capability	−0.280**	0.572**	0.888**	−0.463**	0.453**	0.762**
Power Status	−0.254**	0.527**	0.871**	−0.442**	0.418**	0.801**
Economic Wealth	−0.198**	0.422**	0.775**	−0.343**	0.312**	0.641**
Regime Score	0.193**	−0.090	−0.024	0.043	−0.060	−0.028
Reg. Score at Origin	0.150*	−0.251**	−0.286**	0.298**	−0.234**	−0.296**
Type of Independence	0.455**	−0.321**	−0.245**	0.347**	−0.216**	−0.114
Political Instability	−0.314**	−0.003	0.298**	0.023	−0.164*	0.214**
No. States in PRIE	−0.406**	0.572**	0.854**	−0.508**	0.417**	0.739**
No. of Alliances	−0.248**	−0.005	−0.062	0.075	−0.141*	−0.108
Conflict in PRIE	−0.114	−0.017	−0.314**	0.065	−0.014	−0.275**
Regime in PRIE	−0.005	−0.126*	−0.170*	0.117	−0.122	−0.183**
N	180	180	180	176	180	180

[+] Results reported here are based on measurement of pacifism as the average number of years without any dispute over the state's history.

[++] Results reported here are based on relative fightaholism (see appendix).

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

results are similar, then we can infer that averaging does not lead to substantial inferential bias.

It is important for the reader to remember that this empirical analysis of "correlates" of risk groups is exploratory and is not intended to uncover "causes" of either pacifism or fightaholism. This type of analysis is equivalent to similar analyses conducted in the study of drug and alcohol abuse as well as in studies of behavioral addictions (Teichman 1989). With these caveats in mind, Table 7 presents the results of the analysis linking potential correlates to risk groups.

National Correlates of Pacifism. The results in Table 7 make several interesting points. First, because there exist no states with more than 46 years of independence that fit the definition of MID pacifism (that is, avoided MID participation over their entire history), I focus the discussion on war-pacifism. Out of 182 states with 20 or more years of independence, 103 states (over 56.5 percent) did not participate in a war. All of these states were minor powers; none was a regional power or a major power. Thus, it appears that "minor powerhood" is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for war-related pacifism. Being a regional or major power, even for a short period, is a sufficient condition for nonpacifism.

The most potent intrinsic correlates of war pacifism appear to be military capability, power-related status, economic wealth, type of acquisition of independence, and regime type of origin. Thus, it appears that—beyond the capability/status attributes of states—the basic circumstances in which the state entered the system appear to determine to a significant degree whether or not the state will be a pacifist. States that emerge into the system as a result of an evolutionary process (Maoz 1989, 1996) are far more likely to end up as pacifists than states that enter into the system through a revolutionary political process. On a more general level, pacifist states tend to be militarily weak, less-developed economically, have emerged into the system through an evolutionary process, and were democratic at their origin.

Turning to the extrinsic correlates of pacifism, we note that the politically relevant environment of pacifist states is composed of relatively few other states. Other extrinsic factors do not appear to be correlated with their pacifist tendency.

National Correlates of Conflict Proneness and Fightaholism. Generally speaking, the correlates of conflict proneness and fightaholism are the same as those of pacifism, but in the opposite direction. The strength of associations, however, differs somewhat across measures. Military capability, power status, and economic wealth are significantly correlated with both conflict proneness and fightaholism at medium levels. Here, too, the political circumstances of the state's origin determine its future course. States that came about through evolutionary processes and whose regime at origin was increasingly democratic are less likely to be conflict prone and fightaholics than states that have emerged through revolutionary processes and were nondemocratic. Again, the only meaningful extrinsic correlate of conflict proneness and of fightaholism is the number of states in the focal state's politically relevant environment.

These results highlight the predicament of the international "Gullivers." The rich and powerful find it difficult to escape war involvement. *It is the poor, weak, and relatively isolated states that inherit the peace*.

Dyadic Correlates of Pacifism. The analysis of dyadic pacifism suggests that nearly 57 percent of the politically relevant dyads with at least 20 years of joint history did not engage in an MID. War-related pacifism amounts to 86.5 percent. Table 8 examines dyadic MID- and war-related pacifism.

The results of this table suggest that pacifist dyads display high levels of capability disparity, they tend to consist of at least one minor power, they tend to be jointly democratic, and they tend to emerge through evolutionary rather than revolutionary political processes. The correlates of dyadic pacifism suggest several things. First, with two notable exceptions, all pacifist dyads are composed of no more than one major power. The only major power dyads that avoided war were US–UK and US–Russia/Soviet Union.[11] All MID pacifist dyads were composed of strictly minor powers; all dyads involving at least one major power experienced at least one MID in their lifetime.

A similar observation applies to dyads composed of regional powers. All pacifist dyads have no more than one regional power. With one exception (the Israel-Iran dyad in the Middle East over the 1975–1992 period), all dyads composed of regional powers experienced both MIDs and wars. It appears that *major and regional power dyads are a sufficient condition for nonpacifism*.

And in line with the paradoxical results on the alliance status of dyad members found in previous studies (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bremer 1992), we find that the higher the alliance-related affinity of dyad members, the more likely they are to remain pacifists and the lower their dispute proneness score, but the higher their likelihood of becoming fightaholics. This suggests that common interests do not necessarily override conflicting interests. This paradoxical finding seems to contradict realist notions that strategic interests dampen the probability of conflict (e.g., Farber and Gowa 1995; Gowa 1999). However, this relationship between alliances, or strategic affinity, and nonpacifism may be altered in a multivariate context as was the case in other studies.

The length of the jointly democratic history of the dyad seems to be correlated with the likelihood of MID and war pacifism. However, this correlation is an understatement of the relationship between democracy and pacifism. It turns out that *no two politically relevant states that had been jointly democratic for 70 percent or more of their common history engaged in war.* It also turns out that *only 5 out of 101 dyads that had been jointly democratic for more than half of their common history (US–France, UK–France, US–Italy, Japan–Australia, and Japan–New Zealand) engaged in interstate wars*. Of course, all these wars occurred when one state was nondemocratic. This is extremely powerful evidence in support of the democratic peace

[11]The start of the temporal domain at 1816 "misses" the Anglo-American war of 1812.

TABLE 8. Correlates of Risk Groups (Dyadic Level): Pacifism, Conflict Proneness, Fightaholism

	MIDs			War		
Independent Variable	**Pacifism**[+]	**Proneness**	**Fightaholism**[++]	**Pacifism**	**Proneness**	**Fightaholism**
Capability Ratio	−0.119**	−0.066*	−0.088**	−0.145**	−0.041	−0.052*
Power Status	0.225**	−0.104**	−0.143**	0.222**	0.027	0.041
Economic Wealth	0.106**	−0.026	−0.027	0.115**	0.043	0.050
Regime Score	0.210**	−0.108**	−0.123**	0.174**	−0.050	−0.075*
Reg. Score at Origin	−0.054	−0.058*	−0.091**	0.090*	−0.108**	−0.106**
Type of Independence	0.202**	−0.209**	−0.227**	0.143**	−0.115**	−0.114**
Alliance Affinity	0.116**	−0.321**	0.183**	0.050*	0.031	0.056*
Regime Persistence	0.078*	−0.003	−0.077*	0.041	0.031	−0.021
No. States in PRIE	−0.071*	0.572**	0.133**	0.068*	0.083*	0.128**
No. of Alliances	−0.125**	−0.005	−0.165**	0.083**	−0.083*	−0.091**
Conflict in PRIE	−0.123**	0.233**	0.218**	0.044	0.220**	0.271**
Regime in PRIE	0.034	−0.126*	0.100**	0.079	0.026	0.021
N	1,172	1,172	1,172	1,172	1,172	1,172

[+] Results reported here are based on measurement of pacifism as the average number of years without any dispute over the state's history

[++] Results reported here are based on measurement of fightaholism as the proportion of the state' s decades in which it was coded as fightaholic.

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

proposition. *Long periods of joint democracy tend to spill over into pacifism even when at least one member of the dyad is not a democracy.* In addition, dyads in which both members emerge through evolutionary processes are more likely to end up as pacifist and less likely to end up as conflict prone or fightaholics. This corroborates Maoz's (1996) findings about the relationship between state-making processes and conflict propensity.

Among the extrinsic factors, the most potent correlate of the structural characteristic of the dyad is the number of states in the dyad members' respective PRIEs. In addition, the larger the number of allies each member of the dyad has, the less likely it is to be a MID pacifist but the more likely it is to be war pacifist.

The level of conflict in dyad members' PRIEs is inversely related to their pacifist tendencies and positively related to their level of fightaholism. Other variables do not exhibit significant relationships with the dependent variables. The structural position of a state in terms of the various risk groups discussed here appears, therefore, to have some rather distinct correlates. These correlates are both intrinsic—basic national or dyadic attributes—and extrinsic, referring to the characteristics of states' or dyads' environments.

Conclusion

This survey of national and dyadic conflict-involvement patterns over long historical periods suggests the following observations:

1. *National and dyadic patterns of conflict involvement are characterized by extreme levels of inequality.* A considerable number of states engaged in relatively few MIDs and wars, while a small number of states accounted for a high proportion of all MIDs and wars over the last two centuries. Likewise, a small proportion of the politically relevant dyads accounted for most dyadic conflicts.

2. *There is consistent evidence of national and dyadic conflict-related addiction, or fightaholism*. Specifically, some, but hardly all, of the most conflict-prone states engaged consistently in a pattern of excessive involvement in conflict over a large portion of their national histories. These states tend to form dyads that are engaged in repeated conflict, thus accounting for a disproportionately high fraction of all dyadic MIDs and wars over the 1816–1992 era. The evidence for national and dyadic fightaholism is fairly robust.
3. *Empirical evidence establishes substantial rates of pacifism at the national and dyadic level*. Side-by-side the evidence of fightaholism, there is substantial abstinence from conflict involvement at the national and dyadic levels. Most states and most dyads are neither extreme users of conflict nor are they complete pacifists. Nevertheless, just as a significant minority of fightaholic states and dyads exist, there are a substantial number of states and dyads that do not fight at all. Just as we spend considerable effort trying to account for conflict proneness and conflict addiction, it is time we started studying pacifism systematically.

The preliminary analysis of the correlates of a state's position within a given risk group suggests the following conclusions:

4. *Pacifism has distinct characteristics*. Being a minor power is a necessary—though not a sufficient—condition of pacifism. In addition, pacifist states tend to be militarily and economically weak and tend to have relatively few immediate neighbors.
5. *By and large, the correlates of conflict proneness and conflict addiction are the flip side of the correlates of pacifism; however, there are important exceptions*. In general, factors that correlate positively with conflict proneness tend to correlate positively with conflict addiction and negatively with absolute or relative pacifism, and vice versa.
6. *It is possible and even important to understand national and dyadic patterns over long periods of time*. This is the key conclusion of this study. The analysis of national and dyadic patterns over long historical stretches produces some important insights into issues of conflict and peace. First, evidence about pacifism, conflict proneness, and addiction may be a useful source for theorizing about structural patterns of relations at various levels of analysis. Second, comparing empirical findings from studies focusing on the traditional unit-by-year observation with studies focusing on the long-term tendencies of states and dyads may corroborate existing evidence on the correlates of conflict and war—as many of the findings of this study do. Alternatively, this comparison may reveal important gaps in our knowledge as we address different units of analysis. For years, cross-level paradoxes have perplexed students of war and peace—the level-of-analysis puzzle in alliance and democratic peace studies being only two notable examples (Maoz 2000, 2001).

This study did not attempt to develop a theory of conflict or peace but rather to document some basic patterns of conflict and peace across states and dyads. Generalizing from these patterns into coherent explanations of conflict is left for future studies.

Methodological Appendix

This appendix discusses all the issues related to the research design of this study.

Data Sources

The principal sources of data for this study include the following:

Variable/s	Dataset	Source
MIDs/Wars	Dyadic MID Dataset	Maoz (1999)
Regime/Polity Formation	Polity II–IV	Jaggers and Gurr (1995)
Mil. Capability	COW National Capabilities	http://cow2.la.psu.edu/
Alliances	COW Alliance Dataset	Bennett and Stam (2000)

Spatial-Temporal Domain and Units of Analysis

The temporal domain covers the 1816–1992 period. The spatial domain consists of all states with twenty or more years of national independence over this period ($N = 182$). The twenty-year threshold is due to definitions of units of analysis below.

Two units of analysis are employed. The national-history observation tracks each state over its entire history, from the point it acquired independence to the end of the period (or to the point the state lost its independence for those states that have not persisted to the present). States that were independent prior to 1816 were treated as if they acquired independence in 1815. With regard to measures of MID and war addiction, state-histories required division of the temporal domain into decades (or half-decades for validity tests of these measures), starting the counters with the first year of independence and onwards. Thus, a state that acquired independence in 1838 ended its first decade in 1847, its second decade in 1857, and so forth.

The second unit is the politically relevant dyad history. A politically relevant dyad is made up of contiguous states, a dyad where one of its members is a major power with global reach capacity, or a dyad with a regional power that has regional reach capacity (Maoz and Russett 1993; Maoz 1996, 2001). Each such dyad makes for a single observation, measured over the entire joint history of the dyad. This history is defined from the point when the "youngest" member of the dyad acquired independence to the point where one member ceased to be an independent state, or through 1992. Dyadic addiction measures entailed dividing dyadic histories into decades (or half-decades). Dyads with less than twenty years of joint history were deleted. The grand total for the dyadic analyses is $N = 1{,}172$.[12]

Measurement of Variables

Dependent Variables: Measures of Conflict and Peace:

General Definitions of Conflict: All of the dependent variables are based on the standard definition of MID involvement (Gochman and Maoz 1984:596) and of war involvement (Small and Singer 1982).

Pacifism: I use two definitions of pacifism—absolute and relative pacifism. *Absolute Pacifism* is defined as the absence of conflict (MID/War) given sufficient opportunity. Thus, a state/dyad is considered MID pacifist if it did not participate in any MID (either as initiator, target, or joiner) during its entire (joint) history. A state/dyad is considered a war pacifist if it did not participate in an interstate war during its entire history. *Relative Pacifism* is measured as the average number of years of peace (absent any MID/war involvement) of a state/dyad.

[12]Analyses were performed also for the population of states/dyads with a minimum of 30 years of history. Results were largely robust over these breakdowns.

Conflict Proneness: Conflict proneness is the number of dyadic MIDs/war involvements of a state/dyad per year. Note that each dyadic MID underway in a given year gets a score of one. Thus, if a state is involved in five MIDs (or in one MID involving five actual opponents) during a given year, it gets a score of 5 for that year. Likewise, if a state started a MID during one year and this MID extended over a period of four subsequent years, the state gets a score of one for each year this MID was in progress.[13]

Measures of MID and War Fightaholism: Following the definitions of fightaholism in section three of this study, the procedure for developing measures of addiction was as follows. First, there are no strict benchmarks for defining "normal" involvement in conflict and no strict benchmarks for defining "periods" pertaining to intervals during which exposure to conflict is measured. Hence, I use two alternative intervals of exposure to conflict. Also, due to the complexity of this concept, I develop two alternative sets of measures. Both are used in the analyses presented herein.

To start with, I take the date of a state's entry into the system as the baseline for measuring its conflict involvement. From this point of system entry, I break the state's history into two sets of alternative intervals, half-decades and decades. Then I assess its relative addiction severity and cumulative addiction.

Relative Addiction Severity (*RELADCT*) is developed in several steps. First, each nation's history is divided into decades starting with its year of acquisition of independence and forward. Thus, for a state that became independent in 1951, the first decade covers the years 1951 to 1960, the second decade covers the years 1961 to 1970, and so forth. Second, for each decade interval, and considering all independent states during that interval, the average number of disputes or wars per state is computed. This establishes the "normal level of conflict involvement." Thus, over the decade 1951 to 1960, the "normal level of MID involvement" is given by:

$$NORMID_{1951-1960} = \frac{\sum_{t=1951}^{1960} \sum_{i=1}^{nt} DYDMID_{it}}{\sum_{t=1951}^{1960} NOSTATES_t}, \tag{1}$$

Where $DYDMID_{it}$ is the number of dyadic MID involvements of state i in year t, and $NOSTATES_t$ is the number of states in the system in year t. Next, for each state, the relative level of conflict involvement is computed in the following manner.

$$MIDADCT_{i,1951-1960} = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \frac{\sum_{t=1951}^{1960} DYDMID_{it}}{NORMID_{1951-1960}} & \text{if } NORMID > 0 \\ 0.1 & \text{if } NORMID = 0 \\ & \text{or } MIDADCT = 0 \end{array} \right\}, \tag{2}$$

A score of 0.1 is assigned to MIDADCT when it assumes the value of zero in order to avoid multiplication by zero in the subsequent stage. Thus, a state that experiences above average levels of MID involvement over a decade gets a score larger than one, while a state that experiences below-average involvement over a decade receives a score between 0.1 and 1. This establishes the state's rate of

[13]See Maoz (1998) for a justification for focusing on disputes underway rather than dispute outbreak in studies of international conflict.

conflict involvement over a decade relative to the "normal" or average level of involvement over that decade.[14]

Recall that by addiction to conflict, or fightaholism, we refer to excessive conflict involvement over long periods of time. Thus, fightaholism increases with the length of time (number of decades) a state is excessively involved in conflict. Accordingly, I measure the relative fightaholism of a state over its entire history using the formula:

$$RELADCT_i = \left(\prod_{d=1}^{k} MIDADCT_{id} \right)^{1/k}, \tag{3}$$

In the formula, d indexes the nation-decade starting with the first decade of independence and going to the last (or last decade prior to 1992). This last decade is indexed by k. Thus, *RELADCT* is the geometric mean of the decade-rate of addiction scores at the end of the period of observation. The same logic was applied to time units of five years and to dyadic addiction. In the latter case, the i index in Equations (1)–(3) refers to politically relevant dyads rather than to individual states.

Cumulative Addiction reflects the pro portion of a state's duration in the system during which it was characterized as addicted. First, I generate a relative positioning of the state in terms of its MID/war involvement during a given decade by:

$$TFMID_{it} = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 1 & if\ MID_{it} > 75\ pctile\ MID_t \\ 0 & if\ MID_{it} \leq 75\ pctile\ MID_t \end{array} \right\} \tag{4}$$

In this formula, $TFMID_{it}$ is the relative positioning score of MID involvement. Thus, a state whose conflict involvement rate during a given decade was higher than the conflict involvement of 75 percent of all states existing during this decade gets a high addiction severity score for the decade. States whose MID involvement rates were equal to or lower than the 75 percent most dispute-prone states received got a score of zero.

Next, I cumulated across all consecutive ten-year periods where a state received a *TFMID* score of 1, such that the first period gets a score of 1, the second 2, and so forth. This variable is labeled *CUMIDAD*. The counter is set to zero whenever a decade exists that a state gets a score of zero (that is, it drops out of the 25th upper percentile of MID-prone states). The relative cumulative MID addiction score is then computed by:

$$RELCUMID_i = \frac{Max(CUMIDAD)_i}{MAXDECAD_i} \tag{5}$$

$MAXDECAD_i$ here is the number of decades during which the state was an independent system member.[15]

Risk Groups: As is customary in research on obsessive behavior in the behavioral or psychiatric sciences, subjects are placed into risk groups in order to uncover correlates of addiction or other chronic obsessive behaviors. Risk groups are defined as follows:

$$Risk\ Group = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & if\ state/dyad\ is\ paifist \\ 2 & if\ state/dyad\ fightaholic\ for\ more\ than\ half\ its\ history \\ 1 & otherwise \end{array} \right. \tag{6}$$

[14] I use this measure rather than normal scores (Z-scores), because of the highly skewed distributions of conflict and war involvement.

[15] The same operations with appropriate adjustments are conducted for war-related fightaholism and for MID and war fightaholism at the dyadic level.

Independent Variables:

National Attributes

(1) Military Capability: The average fraction of a state's military expenditures and military personnel of the system's total.
(2) Economic Capability: Measured as the average fraction of a state's iron and steel production and its energy consumption.
(3) Power Status: The proportion of the state's history during which it qualified as a major or regional power (Maoz 1996:139; 2001).
(4) Regime Score: From Maoz and Russett (1993), the regime score is defined as: $REGIME = (DEMOC–AUTOC) \times CONCEN$, where *DEMOC* is a state's democracy score, *AUTOC* is its autocracy score and *CONCEN* is its power concentration score.
(5) Type of National Origin: Following Maoz (1989, 1996), this concept is measured as 0 if the emergence of the state into the system was done in an evolutionary fashion, and 1 if it entered the system through a revolutionary/violent process.
(6) Regime Score at Origin: The regime score of the state at the year it entered the system.
(7) Regime Stability: Number of regime changes divided by the length of the state's history.
(8) Number of States in *PRIE*: The average number of states in a given nation's *PRIE*.
(9) Number of Allies: Average number of states having alliance ties with the focal state (Maoz 1996:169–170; 2000:140).
(10) Number of MIDs/Wars in *PRIE*: Number of dyadic MIDs/Wars in the *PRIE* of the focal state, excluding MIDs/Wars involving the focal state.
(11) Average Regime Score in *PRIE*: Average regime score in the focal state's *PRIE*. (Also measured in some analyses as the proportion of states in one's *PRIE* that are democratic; see Maoz 1996: 171; 2001).
(12) Instability in *PRIE*: Average number of regime changes in the state's *PRIE*

Dyadic Attributes

(1) Capability Ratio: Average ratio of military capabilities of strongest to weakest state in dyad. (Bremer 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993).
(2) Power Status (PS) of Dyad: Average (arithmetic mean) score of dyad on the following scale:

$$PS = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 0 & Minor - Minor \\ 1 & Minor - \mathrm{Re}gional \\ 2 & Minor - Major \\ 3 & \mathrm{Re}gional - \mathrm{Re}gional \\ 4 & \mathrm{Re}gional - Major \\ 5 & Major - Major \end{array} \right\}$$

(3) Alliance Status: Proportion of years during which dyad members were allied.
(4) Similarity of Interests: Bueno de Mesquita's (1981) tau-b measure of similarity of interests based on similarity of alliance portfolios of members of dyads. I also use Signorino and Ritter (1999) measures, labeled as *S* and the weighted version of *S* labeled as W_s.

(5) Regime Stability: Average number of (violent or nonviolent) regime changes as defined by Maoz (1996:128, 219–220).
(6) Type of Dyad Origin: This variable is coded as *two* if both dyad members entered the system through a revolutionary process, *one* if one entered the system in a revolutionary fashion and one entered through an evolutionary process, and *zero* if neither member of the dyad entered the system through revolutionary processes.
(7) Minimum Regime Score of Dyad: Smallest of average regime scores of members of dyad.
(8) Minimum Regime Score at Dyad's origin: Smallest of the regime scores of dyad members at the year the "youngest" member entered the system.
(9) Number of MIDs/Wars in Dyad's *PRIE*s: Minimum average number of MIDs/wars in the *PRIE*s of dyad members.
(10) Average Regime Score in Dyad's *PRIE*s: Smallest of average regime score in states' *PRIE*.

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